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THE EXCEPTION THAT APPROVES THE RULE: FDF 
VARIANCES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
William Funk* 
Recently, in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. NRDC,l the 
Supreme Court addressed once again the applicability and scope of 
the so-called "fundamentally different factors variance"2 from the 
effluent limitations of the Clean Water Act. 3 Specifically, the Court 
held that the statutory prohibition against the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "modifying" any toxic ef-
fluent limitation4 did not prohibit FDF variances from toxic effluent 
limitations. 5 Thus, toxic polluters may seek variances from the gen-
erally applicable toxic effluent limitations based upon their particular 
circumstances. In practical effect this can only lead to less stringent 
controls on toxic water pollution. This conclusion and the Court's 
analysis which led to it are notable for several reasons. First, it 
marks the continuation of a judicial reconstruction of the Clean 
* Associate Professor, Lewis and Clark Law School; B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1973, Colum-
bia. The author would like to thank Michael C. Blumm for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
I 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985). 
240 C.F.R. §§ 125.30-.32, 403.13 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as FDF variance]. 
:J The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first passed in 1948 (originally codified at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1165), and it was amended twelve times between 1948 and its major revision 
in 1972. It was again substantially amended in 1977. The title of the 1948 Act was "The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act." Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, § 518, 62 Stat. 1155. 
The 1972 Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et. seq. (1976), was officially 
titled "The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972," Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
§ 1, 86 Stat. 816, but was popularly known as the "Clean Water Act." The 1977 Act, Pub. L. 
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et. seq. (1982), recognized this new name and 
was titled "The Clean Water Act of 1977," Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat. 1566. For ease 
of reference here, the various acts generally will be referred to as the Clean Water Act, the 
C.W.A., or the Act. When necessary, the 1972 Act or 1977 Amendments will be specified. 
4 "The Administrator may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any 
specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 1307(a)(I) of this Act." 
C.W.A. § 301(1),33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (1982). 
5 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1112. 
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Water Act with regard to variances. Second, it constitutes the Su-
preme Court's first substantial application of the rule enunciated in 
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,6 governing the proper scope of judicial 
review of an agency's construction of its own statute. Third, its 
analysis appears to be inconsistent with an analysis used by the 
Court in its first Clean Water Act variance case,7 in which the 
appropriate circumstances for variances were set forth. Fourth, al-
though there had been considerable question about the issue, the 
Court's analysis suggests that FDF variances should be available 
from certain other effluent limitations. 
Initially, to appreciate the significance of, as well as merely to 
understand, Chemical Manufacturers, it is necessary to retrace 
some of the tortuous history of the Clean Water Act and its inter-
pretation. The first section of the article, therefore, describes the 
1972 Act and implementing regulations. It then discusses industry's 
objections to those regulations and the resulting litigation. In the 
du Pont case,8 the Supreme Court resolved that litigation by up-
holding all of EPA's effluent limitation regulations. Its decision, 
however, also invented an undefined variance requirement with re-
spect to one set of regulations and a prohibition against variances 
with respect to another set. This section concludes that the du Pont 
opinion left the scope and applicability of variances under the Act 
hopelessly confused. 
The second section of the article addresses the litigation that 
resulted from the confusion regarding the scope of the variance the 
Court had said in du Pont was required. Again the Court ruled 
against industry and upheld EPA's regulation. This section concludes 
that the Court's decision, which clarified the narrow scope of the 
variance the Court in du Pont had required, did nothing to clarify 
the underlying justification for the variance. Indeed, what rationale 
was provided was at odds with the Court's analysis in du Pont, 
where it had held variances prohibited in certain circumstances. 
The third s~ction of the article discusses the Chemical M anufac-
turers case at length and concludes that the Court erred in finding 
that the statutory prohibition against modifications did not apply to 
FDF variances. This section of the article argues that this error 
derived from the Court's earlier confusion regarding the rationale 
for the nonstatutory variance as well as from the Court's overly 
6 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 
7 See E.!. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
8Id. 
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strict application of the rule stated in Chevron. This section also 
argues that such a strict application of the Chevron rule seriously 
undermines the judicial function in reviewing agency action. 
The fourth section of the article assesses the state of the law in 
light of Chemical Manufacturers with respect to the permissibility 
of FDF variances from various Clean Water Act limitations and 
standards. It concludes that, in all the circumstances where EPA 
has currently provided for them, FDF variances are permissible 
under Chemical Manufacturers. In other possible circumstances, 
however, the ruling in C hemical Manufacturers does not provide 
much support for the permissibility of FDF variances. 
Finally, the article assesses the impact of Chemical Manufactur-
ers on environmental quality, concluding that institutional consid-
erations lead EPA to construe narrowly the FDF variance provisions 
in its regulations. This, in turn, suggests that Chemical Manufac-
turers will not have important environmental consequences. 
1. EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND THE DU PONT CASE 
A. The Act 
In 1972, Congress enacted comprehensive amendments to the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act,9 and thereby created the current 
regulatory structure addressing the problem of water pollution. Cen-
tral to the new scheme was a shift of responsibility from the states 
to the federal government lO and a shift of control technique, from 
one focusing on receiving water quality to· one focusing on technol-
ogy-based effluent limitations. The new system, with the ambitious 
and unrealistic goal of eliminating all pollution discharges into the 
waters of the United States by 1985,11 was to be phased in over a 
number of years. With respect to existing sources of water pollution, 
9 See supra note 3. 
10 Section 101(b) of the 1972 Act - the statement of goals and policy - stated that: 
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to 
plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) 
of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise 
of his authority under this Act. 
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). Nevertheless, the shift of responsibility away from the states is 
apparent throughout the Act, especially in those sections which while allowing states certain 
responsibilities usually subjects them to federal oversight in their exercise. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1299, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1342, and 1344 (1982). See generally Note, Clearing Muddy 
Waters: The Evolving Federalization of Water Pollution Control, 60 GEO. L.J. 742 (1972). 
11 C.W.A. § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976). 
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the first step was to require polluters to utilize the "best practicable 
control technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977;12 the 
second step was to require these same dischargers to meet the 
expectedly stricter requirement of using the "best available tech-
nology economically achievable" (BAT) by July 1, 1983.13 New 
sources, those sources not yet under construction at the time pro-
posed standards were published, were to be required to use the 
"best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operat-
ing methods, or other alternatives" (BADT).14 All polluters would 
be required to obtain a permit from either EPA or a state whose 
permit program was approved by EPA. 15 
Unfortunately, the amendments were unclear exactly as to how 
this scheme would be put in place. It was clear that, as a first step, 
EPA was to promulgate regulations to be used as guidelines for 
determining the BPT and BAT effluent limitations. 16 Indeed, section 
304(b) required these guidelines "[fJor the purpose of adopting or 
revising effluent limitations. "17 These guidelines were to identify the 
degree of effluent reduction attainable through use of BPT and BAT 
for classes and categories of point sources. They were also to specify 
"factors to be taken into account in determining the . . . measures 
and practices to be applicable to point sources . . . within such 
categories or classes. "18 Some of the factors were identified in" the 
statute. With respect to BPT limitations, the factors to be considered 
" included the total cost of technology's application in relation to its 
effluent reduction benefits; the age of the equipment and facilities 
involved; the process employed; the engineering aspects of various 
control techniques; process changes; non-water quality environmen-
tal impact; and such other factors as the Administrator deemed 
appropriate. 19 With respect to BAT limitations, the factors were 
identical, except that, instead of considering the total cost in relation 
12 C.W.A. § 301(b)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976). 
13 C.W.A. § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(2)(A) (1976). The deadline was extended by 
the 1977 Amendments to July 1, 1984. C.W.A~ §§ 301(b)(2)(C), (0), & (F), 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(b)(2)(C), (D), & (F) (1982). 
14 C.W.A. § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1976). 
15 C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). Permits issued under this section are known as 
NPDES permits, after the National Pollution DischaJ:"ge Elimination System. See id. 
16 See C.W.A. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). 
17 [d. 
18 C.W.A. § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976) (with respect to BPT limitations). 
Section 304(b)(2)(B) has almost identical language with respect to BAT limitations: "specify 
factors to be taken into account in determining the best measures and pra<;.tices . . . applicable 
to any point source ... within such categories or classes." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976). 
19 C.W.A. § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
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to effluent reduction benefits, the cost of achieving BAT limitations 
was just another factor to be taken into account.20 These guidelines 
were clearly not to constitute the effluent limitations themselves or, 
apparently, to have any direct legal effect. 21 
The use of these guidelines in "adopting or revising effluent limi-
tations" remained unclear. Section 301 of the Act, entitled "Effluent 
Limitations," used the passive voice to describe the achievement of 
the BPT limitations by 1977 and the BAT limitations by 1983.22 
Moreover, the existence of the permitting process, by which each 
20 C.W.A. § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976). As one court explained it, section 
304(b)(1O) required BPT to be determined by balancing the total costs against effluent reduc-
tion benefits (the "comparison factors"), while all the other factors, e.g., age, process employed, 
non-water quality environmental impact, etc., were merely to be considered (the "considera-
tion factors"). To determine BAT, under section 304(b)(2), however, all the factors, including 
the cost, were merely to be consideration factors, with no factors separated out for direct 
comparison. Thus, the court concluded, "Congress mandated a particular structure and weight 
for the comparison factors, ... [but] did not mandate any particular structure or weight for 
the many consideration factors." Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). 
21 Dischargers were not to be liable for violation of the guidelines. See C. W.A. § 301(a), 33 
U.S.C. § 13ll(a) (1976). Persons seeking federal permits that might result in water pollution 
were not required to certify their compliance with the guidelines. See C.W.A. § 401, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(1) (1976). Moreover, while the Act specifically provided for judicial review in the 
courts of appeals of a laundry list of EPA actions, C.W.A. § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) 
(1976), there was no specific provision for judicial review of the section 304 guidelines. This 
left open the possibility that the guidelines were not to be judicially reviewable, so that review 
of the process would not be available until the section 301 effluent limitations were promul-
gated. However, the Eighth Circuit held that section 304 guidelines were reviewable in the 
district court, apparently under the Administrative Procedure Act. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 
515 F.2d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 1975). See also du Pont, 430 U.S. at 123-25 & nn.1l-14. 
22 Subsection (b) of this section provides: 
(b) In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall be achieved -
(l)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other than 
publicly owned treatment works, (i) which shall require the application of the best 
practicable control technology currently available as defined by the Administrator 
pursuant to section 304(b) of this Act ... and 
(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations for categories and classes of 
point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall require 
application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category 
or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of 
eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance with regu-
lations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304(b)(2) of this title, which 
such effluent limitations shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if 
the Administrator finds, on the basis of information available to him (including 
information developed pursuant to section 315), that such elimination is technologi-
cally and economically achievable for a category or class of point sources as deter-
mined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 
304(b )(2) of this Act . . . . 
C.W.A. § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 13ll(b) (1976). 
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polluter was required to obtain a permit,23 suggested at least the 
possibility that any actual BPT or BAT limitation applicable to a 
particular polluter would be determined in the permit proceeding 
for that polluter. In other words, the statute was unclear about 
whether EPA could set BPT and BAT effluent limitations applicable 
to categories and classes of polluters by regulation, or whether each 
individual polluter would have its BPT and BAT limitations set by 
adjudication in a permit proceeding based on the guidelines appli-
cable to his class or category. 
B. The Regulations 
Whatever Congress had contemplated, practical difficulties soon 
became a more significant determinant of EPA's course of action. 
The various deadlines imposed by the statute24 were "too ambitious 
for [EPA] to meet,"25and the result was that EPA failed altogether 
to issue the separate guidelines. 26 In addition, EPA decided to issue 
23 See C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). 
24 Within sixty days of the enactment of the 1972 Act, the Administrator was to publish 
information on the amount of effluent reduction possible through secondary treatment, C. W.A. 
§ 304(d)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(I) (1976); and promulgate guidelines for forms for the acqui-
sition of information from owners and operators of point sources of pollution, C. W.A. § 304(h), 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(h) (1976). Within ninety days of the enactment of the Act, the Administrator 
was to publish a list of categories of sources, and propose and publish within a year after a 
category is listed (either originally or in a revision), new source performance standards for 
that category, C.W.A. § 306(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b) (1976). Within 120 days of the enactment 
of the Act, the Administrator was to publish pretreatment guidelines, C.W.A. § 304(f) , 33 
U.S.C. § 1314(0 (1976). Within 180 days of the enactment of the Act, the Administrator was 
to promulgate guidelines for test procedures for analysis of pollutants for section 401 certifi-
cation of section 404 permits, C.W.A. § 304(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(g) (1976). Within six months 
of the enactment of the Act, the Administrator was to enter into agreements with the 
Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior on the use of various programs to achieve and 
maintain water quality, C.W.A. § 304(j), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(j)(1) (1976). Within 270 days of the 
enactment of the Act, the Administrator was to issue information to pollution control agencies 
on operating methods which eliminate or reduce discharge of pollution to implement the 
C.W.A. § 306 standards of performance, C.W.A. § 304(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(c) (1976); and 
issue information on methods to restore and enhance quality in publicly owned fresh water 
lakes, C.W.A. § 304(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i) (1976). Within nine months of the enactment of 
the Act, the Administrator was to publish information on available alternative waste treatment 
systems, C.W.A. § 304(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d)(2) (1976). Within one year of the enactment 
of the Act, the Administrator was to publish criteria for water quality reflecting the latest 
scientific knowledge on the effects of pollutants; and to publish information on the factors 
necessary to reduce the effects of pollution and on measurement and classification of pollutants, 
C.W.A. § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976); and was to issue regulations providing guidelines 
for effluent limitations, C.W.A. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). 
25 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 122. 
26 The failure of EPA to issue the section 304(b)(1) guideline regulations on time resulted 
in a citizen suit to compel their issuance. See NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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the effluent limitations by means of regulations. EPA issued so-called 
"effluent limitation guideline" regulations, which established for each 
industry subcategory a single number limitation on the pollutants 
that could be released by an existing source. 27 Thus, the regulation 
determined the permissible pollution authorized for each existing 
polluter, and every existing polluter within' each subcategory was 
subject to the same limitation. This left the permitting proceeding 
with little to do other than decide to which subcategory a polluter 
belonged, virtually a ministerial decision. 28 
In establishing the BPT and BAT limitations regulations, EPA 
purported to make the determinations and to consider the factors 
identified in section 304(b),29 but EPA recognized that data may have 
been unavailable or overlooked30 in the collection of information re-
lating to these factors. The lack of such data could result in an 
inappropriate limitation for a particular class or category of polluter. 
Consequently, EPA provided a mechanism whereby any interested 
person could submit new or additional information to EPA. 31 EPA 
then could determine whether such information rose to the level that 
the factors applicable to a given discharger in fact were fundamen-
tally different from the factors that had been considered in estab-
lishing the limitations for the category or class in which that dis-
charger was categorized.32 If such fundamentally different factors 
While the decision upheld a district court injunction compelling issuance of certain of these 
guideline regulations on a set timetable, it expressly avoided determining whether such 
guideline regulations had to be separate from or could be combined within a regulation setting 
a BPT or BAT limitation. See id. at 710 n.lO!. 
27 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 405.12 (1976) (BPT limitations for receiving stations subcategory 
of dairy industry). 
28 The Act refers to classes and categories of point sources. See e.g., C. W.A. §§ 301(a)(2)(A), 
304(b); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a)(3)(A), 1314(b) (1982). EPA's regulations, however, refer to cat-
egories and subcategories. "Categories" are broad industry classifications: e.g., Textile Mills 
Point Source Category, Cement Manufacturing Point Source Category, Sugar Processing Point 
Source Category. See 40 C.F.R. Parts 405-69 (1985). "Subcategories" are specified subgroup-
ings within a category, e.g., within the textile mills category: Wool Scouring Subcategory, 
Wool Finishing Subcategory, Low Water Use Processing Subcategory, Woven Fabric Finish-
ing Subcategory, Knit Fabric Finishing Subcategory, Nonwoven Manufacturing Subcategory, 
and Felted Fabric Processing Subcategory. See 40 C.F.R. Part 410, Subparts A-I (1985). 
Single number eilluent limitations are promulgated for each subcategory. 
29 See e.g., Notice of Proposed Rule, 38 Fed. Reg. 28,174 (1974) and 39 Fed. Reg. 9,615 
(1973) (preamble to the rule codified in 40 C.F.R. § 415 (1976) governing the Inorganic 
Chemical Manufacturing Point Source Category). 
30 See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 18,594 (1974) (final rule adopting effluent limitations applicable to 
the dairy industry). 
31 See, e.g., id. 
32 Where a state had qualified to implement the section 402 permit system, a person seeking 
an FDF variance would submit his information to the state as permitting authority; the state 
\ 
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were found to exist, EPA would then set an individually based BPT 
effluent limitation for that discharger. Depending upon consideration 
of the factors with respect to that discharger,33 the limitation could 
be either more or less stringent than the one applicable to the 
discharger's category or class. 
Industry objected to EPA's failure to issue the section 304(b) 
guidelines, and also to EPA's setting of the individual effluent limi-
tations by regulation.34 The absence of the guidelines, according to 
industry, was patently illegal, and deprived it of a meaningful op-
portunity to affect the methodology by which effluent limitations 
were set. Of course, industry was well aware that bifurcating the 
effluent limitation decision, by requiring guidelines initially, would 
substantially delay the date any limitation would become enforcea-
ble. Moreover, because mention of the section 304(b) guidelines was 
pointedly absent from the judicial review provision in the Act35 
(which lodged exclusive review of virtually every other EPA deter-
mination in the courts of appeals), industry believed that, when 
guidelines were issued, it should be able to challenge the guidelines 
in the district courts. EPA rightfully saw this view as the basis for 
litigation that would sap its resources and further delay the date 
when effluent limitations would be effective. 
Even more important to industry was its objection to the cate-
gorical effluent limitation regulations. In its view, the statute re-
quired EPA to issue a range of limitations as guidelines for each 
would then make the initial determination. If it was favorable to the applicant, the determi-
nation would be sent to EPA as a recommendation for review. 
33 See, e.g., supra note 27. Interestingly, no similar provision was made with respect to the 
BAT limitations, and there was no explanation for the different treatment. If information or 
factors could be overlooked, or not available with respect to theBPT limitations, information 
or factors with respect to the BAT limitations could similarly be overlooked or not be available, 
creating a similar need for an FDF variance. One possible explanation may be that, whereas 
the Act provided no "safety valve" for BPT limitations, the Act did provide at least one 
statutory exception from the BAT limitations. This was found in section 301(c), which autho-
rized EPA to modify a BAT limitation if a discharger demonstrated that a modified limitation 
would be the maximum use of technology within its economic capability, and that the modified 
limitation would result in "reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge 
of pollutants." In 1979, the EPA extended the FDF variance to reach BAT limitations. See 
infra text accompanying note 119. There was no explanation as to why it had failed to reach 
it originally. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,088 (1978) (preamble to proposed rule). 
34 EPA's effluent limitation regulations extend to virtually the entire range of industrial 
activity. See 40 C.F.R. Parts 405-66 (1985). While not every regulation was attacked, those 
that were affected the chemical industry, the petroleum industry, the steel industry, the meat 
processing industry, the potato processing industry, the plastics industry, the paper industry, 
and the corn and grain milling industry. See generally the cases cited infra note 39. 
35 C.W.A. § 509(b)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976). See also supra note 21. 
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class or category. The permitting authority would then consider the 
factors, specified in the guidelines, to choose a particular limitation 
from that range to apply to the permit applicant. EPA found this 
interpretation of the Act unacceptable for two reasons. First, EPA 
feared that if the permit proceeding was to engage in such substan-
tial decisional tasks, the processing of the approximately 42,000 
permit applications would become virtually impossible. Second, the 
Act provided for EPA to delegate permitting authority to the states 
if they fulfilled certain conditions,36 and most states had applied for, 
and received, that authority. If the permitting authority retained 
substantial discretionary powers in the permit proceeding, allowing 
it to weigh the factors to choose a specific limitation from the range 
in the guidelines, states would be in the position they were before 
the Act, when, for fear of losing industry, they competed with one 
another for the weakest limitations. Industry's argument that EPA's 
proposed permitting procedure displaced the important role of the 
states under the Act reinforced EPA's fears. 
Industry's objections also extended to EPA's promulgation of new 
source standards, which accompanied the effluent limitation regula-
tions for existing sources. 37 Unlike the statutory provisions appli-
cable to existing sources, the section requiring new source standards 
expressly required these standards to be adopted by regulation ap-
plicable to classes or categories of polluters. 38 Moreover, the section 
304(b) guidelines were not to guide the promulgation of the stan-
dards. Here it was clear that the permitting authority would have 
virtually no discretion. Nonetheless, industry asserted that EPA 
was required to provide a variance provision in its regulations to 
take account of exceptional circumstances. 
C. The Litigation 
In a series of court cases, various industries challenged EPA's 
method of proceeding.39 In 1976, the Supreme Court granted cer-
36 C.W.A. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976). 
37 See supra note 30. 
38 C.W.A. § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
39 See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (EPA lacked authority to issue 
the effluent limitation regulations without first issuing the section 304 guidelines, and juris-
diction to review the regulations as section 304 guidelines was in the district court); du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) 
(EPA had the authority to issue the effluent limitation regulations, but the regulations were 
only presumptively applicable to an individual source); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 
F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976) (EPA had the authority to issue the effluent limitation regulations, 
\ 
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tiorari in E .1. du Pont de Nemours v. Train. 40 There the controversy 
reflected the three substantive concerns of industry: (1) whether 
EPA could avoid promulgation of separate section 304(b) guidelines; 
(2) whether EPA could set BPT and BAT effluent limitations by 
category or subcategory of industry in generally applicable regula-
tions, or must instead set them individually in section 402 permit 
proceedings guided by the section 304 guidelines; and (3) whether 
EPA's standards for new sources of pollution must provide for a 
variance, exception, or modification where the circumstances of an 
individual new source justified a departure from the general rule. 41 
With respect to the first two issues, the Court decided that section 
301 was the key to the puzzle.42 By its terms, section 301 did not 
indicate that the BPT or BAT effluent limitations were to be set by 
regulation. 43 Indeed, section 301 did not indicate who was to set the 
effluent limitations or how they were to be set. Nevertheless, while 
the BPT limitations were referred to as "effluent limitations for point 
sources,"44 the BAT limitations were referred to as "effluent limita-
tions for categories and classes of point sources."45 Nowhere in the 
legislative history is there any indication as to the purpose for this 
distinction. 
The Court seized on the reference to effluent limitations "for cat-
egories and classes of point sources," stating that this language 
"leaves no doubt" that the BAT limitations were to be set by regu-
lation.46 Section 301(b)(2)(A) also provided that "for a category or 
class of point sources," the BAT limitations should require elimina-
tion of discharges of all pollutants.47 Due to its focus on classwide 
but the regulations were only presumptively applicable to an individual source), een. denied, 
430 U.S. 953 (1977); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) (EPA 
had the authority to issue effluent limitation regulations that contain a range of limitations 
within which the permit issuer has discretion to set specific limitations as to individual plants); 
American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) (EPA has the authority to issue 
the effluent limitation regulations which apply to individual plants); American Frozen Food 
Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (EPA has the authority to issue the effluent 
limitation regulations which apply to individual plants); Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. v. 
Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) (EPA has the authority to issue the effluent limitation 
regulations which apply to individual plants). See generally du Pont, 430 U.S. at 125 n.15. 
40 du Pont v. Train, No. 75-978, een. granted, 425 U.S. 933 (1976); du Pont v. Train, No. 
75-1473; Train v. du Pont, No. 75-1705, een. granted, 426 U.S. 947 (1976). 
41 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 125. 
42 [d. at 126. 
43 [d. at 12l. 
44 C.W.A. § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(Aj (1976). 
45 C.W.A. § 301(B)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1976) (emphasis supplied). 
46 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 126. 
47 [d. 
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determinations, the statute reflected the methodology of regulation, 
rather than the individualized determinations of permit proceed-
ings.48 
This analysis might resolve the issue for the BAT limitation, but 
it left unresolved the BPT limitation. Here the language of section 
301 did not support a regulation-based effluent limitation. To the 
contrary, the reference in subsection (b)(l)(A) was to effluent limi-
tations "for point sources," which suggested individualized limita-
tions. 49 The Court, however, noted that nothing in the Act "suggests 
any radical difference in the mechanism used to impose limitations 
for the 1977 [BPT] and 1983 [BAT] deadlines."5o 
The Court also assayed the legislative history. In so doing, it 
emphasized Senator Muskie's explanation of the Conference Re-
port. 51 His explanation of section 304, to which the Conference Com-
mittee had made modifications, stressed the need for uniformity 
within classes or categories of point sources, as well as the desire to 
avoid consideration of factors at the time an effluent limitation was 
applied to an individual point source. 52 The Court found that Senator 
48 That the language noted by the court in section 301(b)(2)(A) should reflect a class-wide 
detennination consistent with a regulation is not surprising if one continues to read section 
301(b)(2)(A). In each instance, following the reference to a category or class of point sources, 
is the language "as detennined in accordance with the regulations issued by the Administrator 
pursuant to section 304(b)(2)." Thus, the contemplated regulation reflected in the class-wide 
reference to "category or class of point sources" may well have been the guideline regulation, 
rather than any effluent limitation regulation under section 301. 
49 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(a)(A) (1976). 
50 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 127. 
51 The Court's reliance on lengthy quotations from Senator Muskie's prepared statement is 
not inconsistent with traditional concepts of interpreting legislative history. After all, Senator 
Muskie was the Senate floor manager and, as the Court noted, "perhaps the Act's primary 
author." du Pont at 129. Nevertheless, Senator Muskie was not the sole author. Some ob-
servers thought that he utilized his prepared statement to create a false legislative history, 
one which reflected his personal views with respect to which he had been unable to prevail in 
committee. See e.g., 118 CONGo REC. 33,711 (1972) (remarks of Senator Jackson decrying use 
of floor statements to manufacture false legislative history). With respect to the particular 
issue of whether categorical effluent limitations were to be adopted by regulation or whether 
particularized limitations were to be adopted in pennit proceedings, Senator Muskie's remarks 
not only went beyond the Conference Report, but were somewhat inconsistent with it. For 
example, the Conference Report speaks of the effluent limitations within a class or category 
being "as uniform as possible," S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1972), and the 
guidelines assuring that "similar point sources . . . will meet similar effluent limitations." I d. 
Both comments suggest that point sources within the same class or category would not 
necessarily have the identical effluent limitations, as would be the case if they were set by 
regulation. Senator Muskie's statement, while including the statements from the Conference 
Report, went further and suggested that no consideration of the section 304(b) factors be 
made with respect to particular point sources. See 118 CONGo REC. 33,696, 33,697 (1972). 
52 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 130. 
/ 
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Muskie's language supported the setting of effluent limitations by 
regulation. It raised, however, the question of what purpose the 
section 304 guideline regulations were to serve, if not to guide the 
discretion of the section 402 permit issuers. The Court concluded 
that, in essence, the guidelines were to guide the EPA in its adoption 
of effluent limitation regulations under section 301. 53 
The Court also considered the effect of not accepting EPA's po-
sition. Quoting Justice Harlan, the Court said that "[c]onsiderations 
of feasibility and practicability are certainly germane to the issue 
before us .... We cannot, in these circumstances, conclude that 
Congress has given authority inadequate to achieve with reasonable 
effectiveness the purposes for which it has acted."54 Industry's view, 
according to the Court, would place an impossible burden on EPA, 
because EPA would have to give individual consideration to each of 
the 42,000 existing dischargers who had applied for permits. EPA 
would also have to issue or approve all these permits well in advance 
of the 1977 deadline for the BPT limitation. 55 Finally, the Court 
acknowledged that the interpretation it was affirming had been 
adopted by the agency charged with the administration of the Act; 
and therefore it deserved substantial deference. The Court also 
noted that most of the circuit courts which had considered the issue 
had adopted a similar interpretation. 56 
Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that the statute authorizes the 1977 [BPT] limitations as well as 
the 1983 [BAT] limitations to be set by regulation, so long as 
some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as 
53 The Court brushed aside the fact that EPA had not adopted guidelines even for this 
purpose. It noted simply that the function of the guidelines had been served by the Devel-
opment Document and supporting materials for the effluent limitation regulations. These 
materials had been subject to public inspection and comment. Therefore, any procedural error 
in not publishing separate guidelines was harmless. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 131~3. 
54 Id. at 132, quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 777 (1968). 
65 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 13~3. In fact, EPA had to give individual consideration to virtually 
every discharger because of the delay in promulgating categorical effluent limitations. Pur-
suant to section 402, EPA (or an authorized state) in the absence of an effluent limitation is 
to grant a permit to a discharger imposing "such conditions as the Administrator determines 
are necessary .... " C.W.A. § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976). This necessitated consid-
eration of the particular circumstances of virtually every discharger. Of course, the result was 
that EPA was practically forced to accept whatever the individual discharger alleged should 
be the necessary conditions. 
The Supreme Court's fear that a requirement for individualized consideration would make 
attainment of BPT impossible by 1977 was obviously well-founded. The Court could also have 
noted that even with categorical effluent limitation regu\ations that goal was impossible for 
numerous industries because of EPA's delay or inability to promulgate the regulations on 
time. 
56 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 134~5. See supra note 39. 
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EPA has done by including a variance clause in its 1977 [BPT] 
limitations. 57 
13 
The inclusion in this statement of the need for a variance mechanism 
as a sine qua non of setting the 1977 [BPT] limitations by regulation 
is completely unexplained in the opinion. Indeed, later in the opinion 
when the court restates its holding, no mention is made of the need 
for a variance mechanism. 58 Moreover, not one of the several briefs 
before the Court had suggested such a requirement. 59 In fact, the 
brief on behalf of EPA represented that EPA did not interpret the 
Act to require an FDF variance for existing polluters,60 and the 
NRDC amicus brief went so far as to argue that the FDF variance 
was not permitted under the Act. 61 The lack of explanation for 
requiring a variance for the adoption of BPT limitations by regulation 
becomes especially frustrating in light of the Court's response to 
industry's third claim. 
As indicated above,62 in addition to challenging the EPA's setting 
of effluent limitations by regulations, industry had also challenged 
EPA's failure to include a variance mechanism for its new source 
performance standards under section 306. Section 306 by its terms 
required EPA to promulgate "regulations establishing Federal stan-
dards of performance for new sources . . . . "63 The court below had 
held that EPA should provide for the possibility of variances for new 
sources in individual cases because "[p]rovisions for variances, mod-
ifications, and exceptions are appropriate to the regulatory pro-
cess. "64 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this justification with 
the curt: "[t]he question ... is not what a court thinks is generally 
appropriate to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended 
for these regulations."65 
57 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128. 
58 See id. at 136 ("Consequently, we hold that EPA has the authority to issue regulations 
setting forth uniform effluent limitations for categories of plants."). 
59 In addition to the briefs filed by du Pont and by the Solicitor General's office, amicus 
briefs were filed by the American Paper Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, Appa-
lachian Power Company, American Iron and Steel Institute, and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC). 
6() See Brief of Administrator, EPA, in Docket Number 75-1473 and 75-1705, at 11 n.9, E.!. 
du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Administrator, 
EPA). 
61 See Brief of NRDC, Amicus Curiae, in Docket Number 75-1473 and 75-1705, at 51 n.136, 
E.!. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
62 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
63 C.W.A. § 306(b)(I)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(I)(B) (1976). 
64 du Pont, 541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976) rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
65 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 (emphasis in Jriginal). 
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The Court found that Congress intended the new source regula-
tions to be absolute prohibitions. 66 This intent was to be inferred 
from: (1) the use of the word "standards" itself, which it was said 
implies an absolute prohibition;67 (2) the description of the preferred 
standard as one "permitting no discharge of pollutants";68 (3) making 
unlawful the violation of the standard by "any" operator of "any" 
new source;69 (4) the absence of any statutory provision for a vari-
ance, in contrast to the section 301(c) variance;7o and (5) the inap-
propriateness of a variance in a standard intended to achieve national 
uniformity and maximum feasible control of new sources. 71 These 
explanations for the inappropriateness of a variance mechanism for 
new sources are not only weak, but they also seem to apply equally 
to the variance mechanism from the 1977 BPT limitation. For ex-
ample, the Court had gone to great lengths to show how the legis-
lative history's emphasis on national uniformity for BPT effluent 
limitations supported their adoption by regulation. 72 Nevertheless, 
the Court had found a variance mechanism not only appropriate but 
necessary with respect to BPT limitations. 73 Just as section 306 did 
not contain any provision for a variance from the new source stan-
dards, section 301 did not provide for any variance from the BPT 
limitation. Indeed, the express restriction of the section 301(c) var-
iance to a BAT limitation could be read to imply that variances were 
not intended for BPT limitations. Similarly, as was true for violations 
of the new source standards, "the discharge of any pollutant by any 
person" in violation of the BPT limitation was unlawful. 74 That the 
preferred new source standard was one permitting no discharge 
seems of little relevance to the question of whether a variance is 
allowable in particular circumstances. Furthermore, it would seem 
to have no weight where the no-discharge standard is expressly 
preferred only "where practicable. "75 
The Court ignored the most obvious basis for upholding EPA's 
failure to provide a variance mechanism for new source standards. 
66 Id. 
67Id. 
68 C.W.A. § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(I) (1976). 
69 See C.W.A. § 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e) (1976). 
70 See supra note 33. 
7I du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
72 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 129--30. 
73 See supra text at note 51. 
74 C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976) (emphasis added). 
75 C.W.A. § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (a)(1) (1976). 
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This basis, which EPA presented to the Court,76 is that an FDF 
variance is implicitly authorized but not mandated by the Act, and 
that EPA's determination not to provide a variance for new source 
standards was reasonable. EPA explained that there was a need for 
a variance mechanism where it was making class-wide determina-
tions of the effluent limitations for existing plants because of the 
potential for putting existing plants out of business. Where, how-
ever, the plant was not yet built, the construction of the new plant 
could always be altered or designed in light of the standards. 77 This 
argument was not adopted by the Court. The Court apparently 
preferred its determination that Congress intended the new source 
standards to be absolute standards, without exception. N everthe-
less, whatever the merits of the Court's explanation for forbidding 
variances from new source standards, the explanation (and especially 
its tacit rejection of EPA's argument) further clouds its justification 
for requiring variances for existing sources. 
If one adopts a legal realist's view, and looks beyond the text of 
the opinion, one can suggest an explanation for the Court's ipse dixit 
requiring a variance from the BPT regulations. One could describe 
the battle over the lawfulness of BPT regulations as a struggle 
between industry presenting the better argument based on the text 
and legislative history of the statute,78 and environmentalists (both 
EPA and environmental groups) presenting an argument based on 
necessity and public policy.79 This latter argument flows from EPA's 
two major objections to industry's claim that effluent limitations 
were to be set in the individual permit proceedings: (1) the impos-
sibility of processing the 42,000 permit applications if each had to be 
individually assessed; and (2) the loss of national uniformity if states 
had the discretion to set effluent limitations pursuant to their dele-
76 Brief of Administrator, EPA, supra note 60, at 8. 
77 [d. 
78 It can be argued that the text and history of the Act supports the concept of BPT 
regulations more than it does individualized NPDES permits. For example, section 402, which 
governs the requirements upon which permits may be granted, does not mention the. section 
304(b) guidelines. This silence strongly suggests that the guidelines were not to guide the 
permitting authority. Nevertheless, to the extent that this argument is correct, it leaves 
unexplained the legal requirement for a variance as a condition for BPT regulations. 
79 The main importance of an argument from necessity or policy is to engender the motive 
and the will in a court to tilt in your direction. Once that is accomplished, it is a poor lawyer 
who cannot find ambiguities sufficient in the law and legislative history to provide the court 
with an intellectually respectable justification for the outcome. Nonetheless, because Congress 
is presumed not to pass laws that are impossible to carry out, or whose provisions are at odds 
with the general purposes of the statute, an argument from necessity and policy is also 
responsive to a search for legislative intent where the language is unclear. 
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gated permit authority. One way to mediate this conflict is the 
Solomonic splitting of the baby, which would give something to each 
side. Viewed in this way, the Court's decision in du Pont gives 
environmentalists nationally uniform effluent limitation regulations, 
and gives to industry at least the figleaf of an individualized permit 
proceeding by requiring "some allowance ... for variations in indi-
vidual plants."8o While the Court's analysis of the statute appears to 
justify BPT regulations without variance procedures, the decision 
itself imposes a variance procedure clearly absent from the statute. 
It might be said that the Court reconstructed the Act to accommo-
date the needs of EPA, but preserved for industry the potential for 
some individualized consideration in the permit proceeding. 
The Court's opinion in du Pont slammed the doors on industry's 
attempt to derail EPA's control of effluent limitations by regulation 
rather than by individualized adjudication. Nonetheless, the Court's 
undefined requirement for some allowances for variations in individ-
ual plants sowed the seed for further litigation. Moreover, the ab-
sence of any analytical basis for the requirement, combined with a 
weak and somewhat contradictory justification for a prohibition on 
variances from the new source standards, provided no guidance to 
lower courts faced with that litigation. Thus, the opinion in du Pont 
made the return of variances to the Supreme Court inevitable. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE VARIANCE AND CRUSHED STONE 
The Court's next brush with Clean Water Act variances occurred 
three years later in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n. 81 There 
the Court was faced with the issue it had explicitly avoided in du 
Pont:82 the scope of the variance from the 1977 BPT limitations. The 
Fourth Circuit had held that EPA's variance provision was too re-
strictive. 83 As indicated earlier, 84 EPA included in each BPT limita-
tion a variance provision allowing dischargers to obtain a variance 
by demonstrating that "the factors relating to the equipment or 
facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related 
to such discharger are fundamentally different from the factors con-
80 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128. 
8! 449 U.S. 64 (1980). 
82 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 128 n.19. 
82 See National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, EPA v. 
National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 
239 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) 
(variance upheld). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
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sidered in the establishment of the guidelines. "85 The "factors" were 
to be those specified by the EPA in its guidelines under section 
304(b)(1)(B). 
The industry plaintiffs challenged this variance provision on the 
grounds that it failed to provide for a variance provision where a 
discharger was financially unable to meet the costs of implementing 
the BPT standard. 86 They based their claim on the language of 
section 301(c), the statutory variance provision applicable to BAT 
limitations, which expressly included the discharger's economic ca-
pability to meet the costs of effluent reductions as a consideration in 
the section 301(c) variance decision. 87 The challengers relied on the 
Supreme Court's statement in du Pont that a BPT variance mech-
anism was a necessary corollary to the implementation of BPT ef-
fluent limitations by regulation, and suggested that in order to set 
BPT limitations by regulation, EPA treat BPT limitations like BAT 
limitations, and include a comparable variance provision. Stated an-
other way, since the Court found clear statutory intent to set the 
BAT limitations by regulation, and no clear statutory basis for treat-
ing BPT limitations differently, then it follows that the terms of any 
BPT variances should not differ from those applicable to BAT limi-
tations. 
In response, the Court noted that, by its terms, section 301(c) 
only applied to BAT effluent limitations, so "only if the factors listed 
in section 301(c) bore a substantial relationship to the considerations 
underlying the 1977 [BPT] limitations as they do to those controlling 
the [BAT] regulations"88 would the affordability of the BPT limita-
tions be relevant to the need for a BPT variance. The substantial 
85 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 66 n.2. 
85 EPA had explained that while cost is a "factor" to be considered in setting the BPT for 
a category or class, cost for a particular discharger could be a fundamentally different factor, 
perhaps justifying a variance, only if the cost to that discharger were "x times" the cost to 
the plants which EPA did consider. Whether that discharger could or could not afford those 
costs was irrelevant to the determination. See 43 FED. REG. 44,847-48, 50,042 (1978). See 
also Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 68 n.5. 
87 Section 301(c) provided: 
The Administrator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section 
with respect to any point source for which a permit application is filed after July 1, 
1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source satisfactory to 
the Administrator that such modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum 
use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) 
will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of 
pollutants. 
C.W.A. § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). 
88 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 74. 
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relationship between section 301(c) and the BAT limitations arose 
out of the similarity between the requirements for the variance and 
the requirements for BAT limitations. The latter mirrored on "class 
or category" basis the requirements of the former. The applicant for 
a section 301(c) variance had to show that it would use the maximum 
technology within its economic capability, and that it would make 
reasonable further progress toward the elimination of all dis-
charges. 89 BAT was defined as the "application of the best available 
technology economically achievable for such category or class, which 
will result in reasonable further progress toward . . . eliminating 
the discharge of all pollutants .... "90 Thus, the Court found that 
the section 301(c) variance merely allowed for an individualized de-
termination of a BAT limitation on the basis of the same factors 
which determined the BAT standard for the class. 
No similar connection was found between section 301(c) and the 
BPT limitations. First, section 301(c) required a showing that a 
variance would still result in "reasonable further progress,"91 which 
implied that some progress had already been achieved. Indeed, ap-
plicants seeking a section 301(c) variance would already have had to 
meet the BPT standard, which would not be true of applicants 
seeking a variance from the BPT limitations. 92 Second, the require-
ment in section 301(c) for the variance to mandate "maximum use of 
technology within the economic capability of the owner" was not an 
individualized restatement of the BPT limitation. Consequently, to 
apply such a concept to a variance from BPT would be inappro-
priate. 93 
However, these were not the most important distinctions. 94 The 
Court was most persuaded by the argument that to allow variances 
from BPT based on afford ability "would undercut the purpose and 
function of BPT limitations. "95 Since BPT limitations forbade any 
89 See C.W.A. § 301(c)(1), (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)(1), (2) (1976). 
00 C.W.A. § 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (1976). 
91 C.W.A. § 301(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis supplied). 
92 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75. 
93 Id. 
94 Nor are they very persuasive. The challengers had never asserted that every jot-and-
tittle of section 30.1(c) should be carried over to a BPT variance provision. They claimed simply 
that economic affordability should be relevant to a BPT variance request, not irrelevant as 
EPA had determined. Moreover, it could be argued that to consider the best control technology 
economically affordable by an individual owner was the particularized equivalent of determin-
ing the best practicable control technology currently available as to the class, which is the 
definition of BPT. That is, if a technology is not affordable, it may be neither "practicable" 
nor "available." 
95 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75. 
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level of pollution which was produced by discharges below "the 
average of the best existing performance,"96 the BPT limitations 
were designed to require dischargers either to achieve the limita-
tions or to cease production. To allow variances based on consider-
ations of afford ability, thereby allowing use of technology below "the 
average of the best," would be to permit the use of technological 
controls rejected as inadequate when the BPT limitations were set. 97 
Stripped of its verbiage, the Court's rationale was simply that var-
iances based on the afford ability of the control technology to the 
owner would result in less pollution control than would occur in the 
absence of the variance. Or, as the Court concluded: 
[B]ecause the 1977 limitations were intended to reduce the total 
pollution produced by an industry, requiring compliance with 
BPT standards necessarily imposed additional costs on the seg-
ment of the industry with the least effective technology. If the 
statutory goal is to be achieved, these costs must be borne or 
the point source eliminated. In our view, requiring variances 
from otherwise valid regulations where dischargers cannot afford 
normal costs of compliance would undermine the purpose and 
the intended operative effect of the 1977 regulations. 98 
The primary difficulty with the Court's response to industry is 
that one could make the identical statement with respect to the BAT 
limitations and the 1983 deadline. The BAT limitations were also 
intended to reduce the total pollution produced by an industry, and 
the stricter BAT limitations would necessarily impose higher costs 
on the most polluting plants in the industry. In the absence of a 
variance, the costs must be borne or the plant must be closed. When 
variances are granted, greater pollution necessarily results, inter-
fering with the Act's goal of eliminating all pollution by 1985. Indeed, 
the only distinguishing feature in this regard between the BPT and 
BAT limitations is the existence of section 301(c) as an express 
indication that Congress intended to provide a limited safety valve 
from the BAT standards. Such a difference might well suggest that 
Congress intended no safety valve for BPT limitations. However, 
once the Court decided in du Pont that a variance from the BPT 
limitations was necessary, the effect of that variance - on whatever 
basis it would be granted - would be to increase the level of pol-
96 39 Fed. Reg. 6580 (1974). See also Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 76 n.15. This phrase 
derives from S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1971). 
97 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 76. 
98 [d. at 78. 
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lution. This fact alone should not slam the door on afford ability as a 
basis for the variance. 
The Court looked to the legislative history to confirm its distinction 
between section 301(c) variances and variances from BPT limita-
tions. The Court found "no indication that Congress intended section 
301(c) to reach further than the limitations of its plain language."99 
Yet, how could Congress have expressed any intent with respect to 
a variance it had neither provided for nor anticipated? The idea that 
a BPT variance mechanism was a necessary condition for setting 
BPT limitations by regulation first appeared in du Pont. This idea 
was an invention by the Court, adopted without explanation. Con-
sequently, the Court is, at the least, disingenuous when it concludes 
from the legislative history that Congress did not intend the section 
301(c) variance to apply to the BPT limitations. 
The Court is more convincing, however, when it recites the various 
indications in the legislative history that Congress expected plants 
to be shut as a result of the costs imposed by pollution controls. 100 
The Court inferred from this expectation that afford ability should 
not be a basis for an exception. Nevertheless, many of the state-
ments in the legislative history are not specific as to which limitations 
would have the effect of closing plants; would they be BPT, BAT, or 
both?101 Certainly, even with the section 301(c) variance provision, 
a plant might be closed rather than meet its requirements. 102 Simi-
larly, a BPT variance mechanism that included consideration of af-
ford ability would not necessarily eliminate plant closings because of 
BPT limitations. 
Having concluded that the BPT variance mechanism was not re-
quired to include any consideration of affordability, the Court was 
99 Id. at 79. 
100 See id. at 80-83. 
101 Perhaps the most striking comment was made by Senator Nelson when he rejected the 
alternative of variances where economic hardship was shown. He suggested a small business 
loan fund instead. See id. at 80-81. His comment was directed at the effluent limitations 
generally - not specifically the BPT limitations - and was made before the Conference 
Committee added the section 301(c) variance provision. The adoption of section 301(c) in the 
Conference Committee, after Nelson's speech, undermines to a certain extent the validity of 
using his rejection of variances as a general expression of congressional intent. 
102 Technology "within the economic capability of the owner or operator" might still not 
justify to the owner the costs necessary to apply this technology. For example, technology 
within the economic capability of General Motors still might be too expensive to justify General 
Motors using it on a particular, old plant owned and operated by General Motors. Moreover, 
because section 301(c) in all cases requires reasonable further progress toward elimination of 
all discharges, such progress might be beyond the economic capability of an owner and thus 
lead to a closing. 
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still left with the question of whether EPA's variance provision 
satisfied du Pont's requirements. In answering this question, the 
Court relied heavily on the judicial review doctrine that it must show 
"great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the offi-
cers or agency charged with its administration."103 Here, "in the 
absence of any other specific direction to provide for variances 
••• ,"104 the Court held that EPA had adopted a reasonable con-
struction of the statutory mandate. 105 While the doctrine of deferring 
to agencies' construction of their own statutes is solidly based, 106 and 
is one from which EPA has obtained substantial benefit,107 here its 
use seems somewhat unusual. After all, the Court, and not the 
statute, had required variances from BPT limitations. Moreover, 
EPA's FDF variance had been adopted under its own interpretation 
of the statute as allowing, but not requiring, a variance from BPT 
limitations, an interpretation the Court in du Pont had not accepted. 
In its deference to EPA, the Court shed no light on its view of 
the justification for the FDF variance, nor on the reasons why the 
Court believed it to be required. The Court came close to an expla-
nation earlier in the opinion where, in contrasting EPA's FDF var-
iance with what the industry challengers sought, the Court stated: 
the variance is an acknowledgment that the uniform BPT limi-
tation was set without reference to the full range of current 
practices, to which the administrator was to refer. Insofar as a 
BPT limitation was determined without consideration of a cur-
rent practice fundamentally different from those that were con-
sidered by the Administrator, that limitation is incomplete. 108 
One may infer from this statement, which merely reflects EPA's 
various justifications for the FDF variance,109 that the variance is 
103 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 83, quoting Udall v. Tallman, 30R U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
104 Cr'Ushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 84. 
105 Id. 
105 See, e.g., R. Pierce, S. Shapiro, P. Verkuil, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4.3 
(1985); 5 K.C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:16 (2d ed. 1984); and B. Schwartz, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.1 (2d ed. 1984). 
107 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Union Electric Co. v. 
EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). But see Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 27iJ (197R). See also Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2778; 
and Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1102. 
108 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 77-7R. 
109 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 32,893-94 (1979). The regulation for FDF variances for direct 
dischargers states: 
In some cases ... data which could affect these national limits as they apply to a 
particular discharger may not be available or may not be considered during their 
development. As a result, it may be necessary on a case-by-case basis to adjust the 
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available solely to correct an error in the BPT rulemaking, a failure 
to consider all the necessary information with respect to one or more 
factors. The correction would be made, however, not to the BPT 
effluent limitation regulation, but rather to the particular discharger 
with respect to whom the fundamentally different factor or infor-
mation related. Depending upon how the fundamentally different 
factor compared to those that EPA had considered in setting the 
BPT limitation, the effluent limitation applicable to the particular 
discharger might be made higher or lower than the limitation in the 
regulation. 110 
This rationale for a variance or exception seems entirely reason-
able as a general matter.1l1 What remains lacking, however, is any 
explanation as to why such a variance would be required as a nec-
essary condition to having BPT limitations set by regulation. In 
Crushed Stone,112 it would have been easy for the Court to have 
disavowed, or at least deemphasized, the necessity for a variance 
from the BPT limitation regulation, but the Court did not. Instead, 
it restated it with full force,113 if with no more justification. 
In approving the rationale adopted by EPA, the Court again 
seemed to act inconsistently with the rationale it articulated in du 
Pont for rejecting variances from new source performance stan-
dards. There, the lower court had required EPA to provide a vari-
national limits, and make them either more or less stringent as they apply to certain 
dischargers within an industrial category or subcategory. This will only be done if 
data specific to that discharger indicates it presents factors fundamentally different 
from those considered by EPA in developing the limit at issue. 
40 C.F.R. § 125.30(b) (1984). The regulation for FDF variances from pretreatment standards 
contains similar language, 40 C.F.R. § 403. 13(b) (1984). It was specifically modeled on 
§ 125.30(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 9439 (1981). 
110 Each of EPA's FDF variance provisions has always provided that any person, not just 
a person subject to an effluent limitation, could petition for an FDF variance to be applied to 
a particular discharger. See supra note 29. Theoretically, an environmental group could petition 
for a discharger's limitation to be made stricter on the basis of that discharger's particularized 
factors being both fundamentally different from those of others in its category and supportive 
of stricter standards. As a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely that an outside group 
would be in a position to know the particularized circumstances of a particular discharger, 
and apparently all of the 2000 petitions for an FDF variance have been filed by the discharger 
seeking the variance. The courts in discussing the FDF variance have invariably ignored its 
potential for a stricter standard. 
111 See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972). See also Aman, 
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 
277, 293-94; Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1504 
(1983); Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formation 
of Energy Policy Through an Exception Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163,283-89. 
112 449 U.S. at 64. 
113 See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 72 n.12. 
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ance mechanism for the new source standards. The court reasoned 
that the nature of the standards setting process - by rule making 
- left open the possibility that EPA would omit consideration of an 
essential factor.114 For example, section 306(b)(1)(B) expressly di-
rects that when the Administrator sets new performance standards, 
both the cost of achieving the effluent reduction and any non-water 
quality environmental impact or energy requirements be considered. 
Section 306(b )(2) requires the Administrator to consider the type of 
manufacturing pro(' ,ss employed by the discharger. Certainly, in 
establishing new source standards, EPA could overlook, or not dis-
cover, information with respect to one or more types of sources. In 
such cases, "that data which would affect these limitations [would] 
have not been available and, as a result, these limitations should be 
adjusted for certain plants in the industry."115 Yet it was just this 
"limited escape" mechanism, required by the court of appeals in du 
Pont,116 that the Supreme Court rejected in du Pont: "[T]he ques-
tion, however, is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to 
the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended for these reg-
ulations."ll7 Thus, the rationale for the FDF variance accepted by 
the Court in Crushed Stone is directly at odds with the Court's 
justification for banning variances from new source standards. 
The Court's decision in Crushed Stone clarified the scope of the 
variance which the Court in du Pont had required. What it did not 
do was explain why that variance had been required. Moreover, the 
Court's explanation of the rationale for the FDF variance runs 
counter to its rationale in du Pont for rejecting variances from new 
source standards. This uncertainty in the legal foundation of the 
FDF variance provides the background for the Court's next encoun-
ter with the FDF variance, where the question became whether an 
FDF variance was a modification of section 301's requirements. 
III. CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS 
Subsequent to the du Pont case, EPA expanded the range of 
effluent limitations subject to a possible FDF variance. In 1978, a 
generic FDF variance provision was adopted with respect to pre-
114 du Pont, 541 F.2d at 1018. 
115 The quoted language is from EPA's boilerplate BPT variance provision, and it appears 
over 200 times in 40 C.F.R. Parts 405-459 (1984). See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 405.12 (1984). 
116 See du Pont, 541 F.2d at 1018. 
117 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
• 
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treatment standards, U8 and in 1979 a similar generic provision was 
adopted with respect to all BPT, BAT, and BCT limitations. u9 In 
1977, however, the Clean Water Act had been amended to include 
section 301(Z), which expressly prohibits the Administrator from 
118 43 Fed. Reg. 27,736-73 (1978)(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1984)). The "pre-treatment" 
standards govern sources that discharge into publicly-owned treatment works (POTW), as 
opposed to navigable waters. These standards are "to prevent the discharge of any pollutant 
through . . . [a POTW) , which pollutant interferes with, passes through, or otherwise is 
incompatible with such works." C.W.A. § 307(b)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). This is to 
be accomplished by regulation. [d. 
As a result of EPA's desuetude in promulgating pretreatment standards of any kind, NRDC 
sued EPA. This desuetude related to standards for toxic pollutants generally, of which the 
pretreatment standards were a subpart under the 1972 Act. The EPA was stymied due to 
the difficulty of the substantive criteria to govern the toxic standard (health-based determi-
nations with respect to each toxic pollutant) and the procedure to be employed (formal 
rulemaking). NRDC's suit was fortuitous because it "forced" EPA to proceed in a manner it 
might not otherwise have been able. 
Thereafter, in a consent decree, EPA agreed to a regulatory strategy for "indirect" dis-
chargers (dischargers into POTW's) that would, in part, parallel the direct discharger regu-
latory system. EPA would first impose BPT and then BAT on existing indirect dischargers, 
and would impose comparable technological requirements on new indirect dischargers as were 
imposed on new direct dischargers under section 306. The other part of the strategy was 
simply to prohibit discharges that interfered with or passed through a POTW. See National 
Pretreatment Strategy, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,759 (1978). See also NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't. Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 2110 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub nom. NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env't. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979), a/I'd in part sub nom. EDF v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), modified on remand sub nom. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084 
(D. D.C. 1982). See generally National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 634-
36 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd in part sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 105 S. Ct. 1102 
(1985) (describing the history and substance of the General and Categorical Pretreatment 
Regulations). While under section 307(b) pretreatment standards are not by definition limited 
to toxic pollutants, those are the only pollutants for which EPA has currently issued pretreat-
ment standards. See id. at 645 n.25. Under section 301(b), the pretreatment limitations were 
to be achieved either by 1977, or by 1984, depending upon the POTW into which the polluter 
discharged. See C.W.A. § 301(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (b)(2)(A)(ii), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(A)(ii) & 
(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982). 
119 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,893-94 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.30-.32 (1984)). "BCT" 
refers to "best conventional pollutant control technology." C.W.A. § 301(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(2)(E) (1982). The 1977 Amendments changed the applicability and deadlines of the 
1972 Act's BAT limitations. The BAT limitations after the amendments apply only to toxic 
pollutants, see C.W.A. § 301(b)(2)(C), (D), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C), (D) (1982), and uncate-
gorized pollutants, see C.W.A. § 301(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F) (1982). So-called 
"conventional" pollutants - Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Total Suspended Solids 
(nonfilterable) (TSS), pH, fecal coliform, and oil and grease, 40 C.F.R. § 401.16 (1984) -
would only be held to the potentially lesser standard of BCT. BCT was to be determined 
under the amendments in accordance with regulations issued under section 304(b)(4). Section 
304(b)(4), in turn, was styled after sections 304(b)(1) and (2) with their factors governing the 
adoption of BPT and BAT limitations. In addition to the standard litany of factors to be 
considered, section 304(b)(4) includes a complicated, two-part cost-benefit test. See American 
Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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modifying any section 301 effluent limitation requirement with re-
spect to toxic pollutants. 120 
Thereafter, the NRDC petitioned for review of the 1978 general 
pretreatment regulations on the ground that: first, FDF variances 
from the pretreatment standards were not authorized by the Act; 
and second, the FDF variance was prohibited to the extent it would 
apply to toxic pollutants under the pretreatment standards. The 
Third Circuit agreed with the latter point, and therefore declined to 
reach the first.121 The Supreme Court reversed by a narrow 5-4 
split. 122 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether "§ 301(l) 
forbids the issuance of FDF variances for toxic pollutants."123 The 
Court noted that NRDC had also challenged the authority of EPA 
to issue FDF variances from BAT or pretreatment standards, even 
where toxic pollutants were not involved. The Court found, however, 
that it need not address this issue. It assumed for the purposes of 
argument that such authority did exist. 124 The first hurdle, therefore, 
was the plain language of the statute. On its face, the statute appears 
to bar any variances for toxic standards because it prohibits the 
Administrator from "modify[ing] any requirement" of the section 301 
with respect to a toxic pollutant. 125 The majority, however, cleared 
this hurdle with ease, pointing out that a literal interpretation would 
forbid any change to a toxic effluent limitation. 126 Such a construction 
would not only forbid EPA from correcting an error, or imposing a 
stricter standard, but it would also bar EPA from revising the 
pretreatment standards from time to time as required by section 
307(b)(2). The Court therefore concluded that "[t]he word 'modify' 
... has no plain meaning as used in section 301(l)."127 EPA's position 
was that the term "modify" in section 301(l) is a term of art, not to 
be interpreted according to everyday concepts, but rather in light 
120 See supra note 4. 
121 See National Ass'n of Metal Finishers, 719 F.2d at 624. Earlier, the Fourth Circuit had 
rejected a similar challenge. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
122 Both du Pont and Crushed Stone were decided by 8-0 votes; Justice Powell did not 
participate. Justice Powell was, however, one of the five members of the majority in Chemical 
Mfrs. 
123 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1107. 
124 I d. at n.13. 
125 See supra note 4. 
12fi See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1108. 
127 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1108. 
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of the specialized setting in which it is found. EPA pointed out that 
section 301 contains a number of provisions authorizing or directing 
the Administrator to "modify" one or more requirements of that 
section. 128 It was these "modifications" at which the section 301(l) 
prohibition was aimed, EPA asserted, not the FDF "variance." The 
Court concluded this was a reasonable construction of the statutory 
language, and, therefore, the Court should defer to the agency, 
unless the legislative history or purpose and structure of the Act 
clearly revealed a contrary intent. 
A. Congress' Specific Intent 
The Court embarked upon its search for legislative intent by 
seeking evidence whether Congress intended to affect FDF vari-
ances by its enactment of section 301(l). In Crushed Stone, the 
Court's search for legislative intent regarding the variance it had 
required in du Pont had been ludicrous; the variance had not existed 
in the 1972 Act. Here, however, the 1977 amendments had been 
enacted after EPA invented the FDF variance and after several 
courts, including the Supreme Court, had at least noted it. Conse-
quently, it was at least possible that Congress could have addressed 
the variance. Nonetheless, the Court found no conclusive evidence 
that Congress had intended the section 301(l) prohibition to affect 
FDF variances. 
It is clear that the modifications authorized by section 301(c) and 
(g) were intended to be subject to the prohibition.129 However, in 
describing the section 301(l) prohibition, legislators did not restrict 
themselves to the use of the term "modification;" instead, they often 
used the terms "modification," "waiver," and "variance" without 
apparent distinction. 130 This might be read as reflecting an intent 
that changes to a section 301 limitation on toxic pollutants were 
128 See C.W.A. §§ 301(c), (g), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), (g) (1982). Section 301(g) requires the 
Administrator, with the concurrence of the state, to "modify" BAT limitations (except for 
toxic, conventional, and thermal pollutants) if a discharger shows that the lesser limitation 
will comply with BPT and any state standard, will not result in any greater requirements for 
other sources, and will not interfere with attainment and maintenance of safe and healthy 
water quality. For the text of section 301(c), see supra note 87. 
129 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1109 (quoting remarks of Representative Roberts). 
130 EPA has likewise not been consistent in its denomination of the section 301(c) "modifi-
cat\on." In its regulations, EPA refers to all the various statutory modifications and extensions, 
as well as FDF variances, by the generic term "variances." See 40 C.F.R. § 124.62 (1984) 
(decision on variances). Moreover, in its brief in du Pont, EPA did not distinguish its FDF 
variances from the section 301(c) modification, referring to them as "analogous variances." 
See Brief of Administrator, EPA, supra note 60, at 6 n.7. 
1985] FDF VARIANCES 27 
forbidden, however denominated. The Court, nevertheless, found 
that "many" of these statements were in the context of the section 
301(c) and (g) modifications. Therefore, the fact that the members 
referred to these "modifications" as waivers or variances did not 
necessarily mean that these same members would have meant FDF 
"variances" to be considered "modifications. "131 
The Court found further evidence of a lack of Congressional intent 
to affect FDF variances in the path by which section 301(l) devel-
oped. In the Senate version of the bill,132 there was no section 301(l). 
Rather, a prohibition against modifications relating to toxic pollu-
tants was added to the preexisting section 301(c). A new subsection 
was also added authorizing certain modifications, which became sec-
tion 301(g), but which also prohibited such modifications with respect 
to toxic pollutants. The House version133 had no comparable provi-
sions to section 301(g) or (l), and no change to section 301(c). Thus, 
as the bills passed the House and Senate, it was clear that there 
was no limitation placed on FDF variances with respect to toxic 
pollutants. 
Section 301(l) was added in the Conference Committee. It prohib-
ited all modifications of toxic effluent limitations, and the prohibition 
which had been added to section 301(c) was removed. The prohibition 
in what is now section 301(g), however, was not removed. 134 No 
explanation for section 301(l) was made in the Conference Report. 
In the House, however, Congressman Roberts, the House manager, 
stated: 
[D]ue to the nature of toxic pollutants, those identified for reg-
ulation will not be subject to waivers from or modification of the 
requirements prescribed under this section, specifically, neither 
section 301(c) waivers based on the economic capability of the 
discharger nor 301(g) waivers based on water quality consider-
ations shall be available. 135 
131 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110. 
132 S. 1952, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
133 H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
134 No one has satisfactorily explained why the prohibition against making a modification 
under section 301(g) with respect to a toxic pollutant was left in section 301(g), even though 
section 301(l) contains the same prohibition. Given the substantial reworking of section 301 in 
the Conference Committee, the most likely explanation would appear to be a drafting oversight 
during the frenetic Committee Session. 
135 123 CONGo REC. 38,960 (1977). Compare Senator Muskie's remarks. Id. at 39,183. Senator 
Muskie equated conventional pollutants and toxic pollutants with respect to "waivers or 
modifications," and concluded that "they are not affected by any waivers or modifications, 
either on the basis of cost or on the basis of attainment and maintenance of water quality 
.... " See also remarks of Senator Muskie. Id. at 39,172. 
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The absence of any mention of FDF variances was viewed by the 
Court as especially significant. Had Congress intended to limit FDF 
variances as well as the specifically mentioned modifications, it would 
have so stated, because "Congress was undoubtedly aware of du 
Pont, and absent an expression of legislative will, we are reluctant 
to infer an intent to amend the Act so as to ignore the thrust of an 
important decision. "136 
As far as it goes,137 the Court's conclusion that Congress did not 
express any intent with regard to the FDF variance hardly can be 
faulted. 138 Indeed, except to the extent that Congress was aware of 
the details of EPA's regulations or the specifics of recent court 
decisions, it would be slightly short of incredible for Congress to 
have had a specific intent with respect to the FDF variance, much 
less to have expressed it. That is, unless Congress was aware of the 
practice of FDF variances, there would be no reason for it to discuss 
a variance procedure it had never created. In that regard, the 
Court's conclusion that "Congress was undoubtedly aware of du 
Pont" takes on special importance. 
First, whatever Congress may have known of du Pont, it could 
not have known what the Court states the decision stood for: "[I]n 
[du Pont], we upheld the EPA's class and category limitations, 
relying on the availability of FDF waivers."139 This is clearly re-
writing history; the only mention of FDF variances in du Pont occurs 
in a footnote which quoted the EPA regulation,140 and the Court 
expressly declined to determine whether EPA's variance provision 
(the FDF variance) satisfied the requirement for "some allowance 
for variations in individual plants. "141 Thus, Congress would have to 
have been prescient to have known in 1977 that the Court in 1980 
in Crushed Stone would hold the FDF variance to be the variance 
required in du Pont. 
Second, evidence to support a conclusion that Congress was even 
aware of FDF variances, or of du Pont, is scant. The Court refers 
to two items. The first is that a representative of NRDC testified at 
136 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1109 (footnotes omitted). 
137 See infra text at note 154. 
136 The dissent's complaint is directed at the narrowness of the Court's view of the relevant 
history, rather than with its conclusion that Congress had no specific intent with regard to 
FDF variances. Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1113 (Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, J., dis-
senting; O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
139 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1109 (emphasis supplied). 
140 See du Pont, 430 U.S. at 123 n.10. 
141Id. at 128. 
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a hearing that there was a "fundamental variance provision [sic]."142 
This one reference, especially with an incorrect denomination, in the 
hundreds of pages of hearing testimony, almost suggests the opposite 
of the Court's conclusion. If in all the oversight hearings and hearings 
relating to amendments to the Clean Water Act, only one, incorrect 
reference to FDF variances was made, it almost proves they were 
so obscure as to be unknown to Congress. 
The second evidence of congressional knowledge cited by the 
Court is a reference made by Representative Clausen, the ranking 
minority member of the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the 
House Public Works and Transportation Committee, in the House 
debate on the Conference Report.143 This reference, however, is not 
to the FDF variance at all, or even to the du Pont decision, but 
rather it is to a report submitted to him in September, 1977, by the 
142 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1109 n.17. The Court actually reports that "[al represen-
tative of NRDC testified before Congress that a 'fundamental variance provision' was integral 
to the Act's system of 'national, uniform, minimum effluent limitations.'" This, however, is 
not at all an accurate quotation. The general discussion involved EPA's use of "delayed 
compliance penalties" to address widespread violation of the 1977 standards (supported by 
NRDC) instead of changing the 1977 deadlines (supported by industry). An industry repre-
sentative suggested that, if individually tailored delayed compliance penalties were appropri-
ate, then so were individually tailored effluent limitations in permits. On the other hand, EPA 
(and NRDC) had supported (in du Pont and elsewhere) across-the-board BPT and BAT effluent 
limitations. The NRDC representative responded: 
The reason for requiring the national, uniform, minimum effluent standards, BPT 
and BAT, is to pursue principles which Congress found, after extensive hearings on 
the enactment of this Act, were necessary to achieve effective water pollution control. 
Congress had experience since 1948 or so with various water pollution control laws, 
all of which were modeled on water quality standards and also case-by-case analysis. 
Precious little happened in cleaning up the water. 
Not until Congress enacted the 1972 act did we begin to develop the system which 
has been effective in establishing national, uniform, minimum effluent limitations. It 
provides discretion to the states to apply higher standards if they wish. It would also 
actually be implemented, and it takes account ofthe individual concerns of the various 
industries. There is a fundamental variance provision. In each and every regulation 
issued by EPA, industry is involved intensively in the process and in the development 
of these standards. With those factors involved, it seems to me most unwise to 
consider anything other than the system developed by Congress and enacted into 
law. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Environmental Pollution, Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Serial No. 95 - H25, Part 9, at 36-37 (1977). NRDC nowhere suggested that an FDF variance 
was integral or even important to the Act, or to national, uniform, minimum effluent standards. 
In the context, the reference to the variance is unexplained and of no particular note or 
significance. It is somewhat ironic for the Court to cite NRDC for the proposition that FDF 
variances were integral to the Act. In du Pont, NRDC had argued that FDF variances were 
not authorized by the Act. See supra note 61. 
143 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1109 n.17. 
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) entitled "Case Law Under 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972."144 
Even if this document had been generally available prior to the votes 
on the Conference Report,145 and even if members had read it, they 
would have found little in it concerning FDF variances. The term, 
"fundamentally different factors," appears only once, in a paren-
thetical description of American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA,146 
a pre-du Pont case which held that EPA's single-number BPT ef-
fluent limitations were unlawful, because, notwithstanding EPA's 
FDF variance procedure, they were too inflexible. 147 Moreover, in 
describing the language in the du Pont case addressing the "allow-
ance ... for variations in individual plants," which the Court had 
held was necessary to the 1977 [BPT] limitation regulations, the 
CRS Report merely states that this was the "only aspect of the 
Court's decision ... favorable to industry's position" and "seem[s] 
to mandate" a variance provision for the 1977 limitations similar to 
the one expressly provided in section 301(c) for the 1983 standards. 148 
Finally, the CRS Report describes: the pre-du Pont disagreements 
among the courts of appeals over the need for, and scope of, variance 
provisions; and the failure of du Pont to decide the scope of that 
variance. 149 While these references indicate that du Pont required 
"some allowance ... for variations in individual plants," they indi-
cate that there was no hint, much less any "thrust," that the variance 
required was an FDF variance. To the contrary, the one hazarded 
guess was that the variance would be the equivalent of the section 
301(c) waiver. 150 In short, the CRS Report provides no evidence that 
Congress was aware that du Pont called for FDF variances. 
144 See House Public Works and Transportation Comm. Print 95---35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977) [hereafter referred to as CRS ReportJ. At the conclusion of Representative Clausen's 
extensive remarks supporting the bill, he observed that there had been much litigation under 
the Act, and that a full understanding of the statute could only be achieved by a full under-
standing of the case law. Consequently, he said, the CRS Report "is being printed" as a 
committee document. Representative Clausen stated that he believed "this report will prove 
to be most useful." 123 CONGo REc. 38,976 (1977). 
145 There is some question whether the printed CRS report was published before the 
December 15, 1977 vote. The printed document is dated "November 1977," but such dates on 
Committee prints do not always reflect the date they are available. Representative Clausen 
in his remarks, moreover, referred to the CRS report as "being printed," not as having been 
printed. Id. 
146 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). 
147 See CRS Report, supra note 144, at 28. 
148 Id. at 20. Of course, in Crushed Stone, the Court later held that the "allowance" referred 
to in du Pont was not similar to the section 301(c) provision. 449 U.S. at 74-77. 
149 See id. at 27-28, 38-39, 73. 
150 See id. at 20. Had the CRS Report's guess been accurate, then the express legislative 
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At best, the evidence marshalled by the Court to establish 
congressional awareness is miniscule. The question is not whether 
Congress can be legally charged with knowledge of FDF variances, 
because pUblication in the Federal Register constitutes legal notice 
of governmental regulations. Instead, the question is what Congress 
in fact knew. In construing section 301(Z), the Court is not concerned 
with the legally operative effect of congressional silence with respect 
to FDF variances. It is concerned with the historical context in 
which section 301(l) was enacted, as that context sheds light on the 
section's meaning. 151 Congress' silence is part of that context. The 
significance of that silence, however, depends on what Congress 
knew with regard to FDF variances. As indicated above, the indi-
rectness and insubstantiality of the materials cited by the Court do 
not support its conclusion that Congress was aware of the FDF 
variance. Rather, the total silence regarding FDF variances in the 
legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress was una-
ware of the practice. Finally, the fact that, by 1977, only 50 of 4,000 
major industrial dischargers covered by BPT limitations had even 
applied for an FDF variance,152 and only two had been granted, 153 
suggests that neither industry nor environmentalists would have 
brought them to Congress' attention. In short, it is difficult, to say 
the least, to sustain the Court's conclusion that Congress was "un-
doubtedly aware" of the FDF variances. Yet that awareness would 
be a necessary prerequisite to assigning any significance to Congress' 
failure to demonstrate a specific intent to bar such variances with 
respect to toxic pollutants. 
The dissent does not appear to argue that the Conference Com-
mittee had any specific knowledge of or intent with regard to FDF 
variances, but it does argue that there was a specific legislative 
intent in section 301(Z) to bar any changes in toxic standards, not 
just the modifications in section 301(c) and (g).154 Evidence of this 
intent is found in the Conference Committee's creation of section 
301(Z). As the bill passed the Senate, section 301(c) and the prede-
cessor of section 301(g) each contained its own toxics exception. 
Unless the Conference Committee meant section 301(Z) to apply to 
history that section 301(l) prohibited section 301(c) modifications would have overcome any 
claim that Congress had ignored the "thrust" of du Pont. See supra text at note 135. 
151 See generally Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds ofCongres-
sional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 529 (1982). 
152 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1107. 
153 [d. 
154 See id. at 1117-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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more than the sections 301(c) and (g) modifications, there would have 
been no need to adopt section 301(l) at all. More importantly, the 
language of section 301(Z) bars the modification of "any requirement 
of this section." Subsections (c) and (g), however, only modify sub-
section (b)(3)(A) [the BAT limitation]. Thus, according to the dissent, 
Congress intended section 301(Z) to apply to more than just modifi-
cations under sections 301(c) and (g). 
One can accept the dissent's argument on this point without reach-
ing the dissent's conclusion that section 301(Z) must apply to FDF 
variances. The dissent, as well as the majority, ignores the fact that 
section 301 authorizes additional modifications to its requirements 
beyond those in sections 301(c) and (g). For example, subsections 
(h), (i), and (k)l55 provide for modifications of various effluent limi-
tations, which should be subject to section 301(Z),s prohibition if they 
affected a toxic pollutant. 156 Although the legislative history is as 
silent regarding any link between these modifications and section 
301(Z) as it is regarding any link between FDF variances and section 
301(Z), these other statutory "modifications" were also adopted by 
the Conference Committee. Their adoption suggests that the crea-
tion of section 301(Z) was as a generic prohibition to modifications of 
section 301 requirements. 
What emerges from this resounding silence in the legislative his-
tory regarding FDF variances is a confident conclusion that Con-
gress was not aware of FDF variances to a degree necessary to have 
any specific intent as to their treatment under section 301(l). Under 
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,157 the absence of a specific congressional 
intent answers the first of the two questions a court should ask when 
155 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h), (i), (k) (1982). 
156 Section 301(h) provides a modification procedure by which POTW's could have their 
secondary treatment requirements under subsection (b)(1)(B) modified with respect to dis-
charges into marine waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (1982). Section 301(i) allows for a modification 
to obtain an extension of the 1977 deadline imposed by sections 301(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B) and (C) 
(pretreatment standards for point sources discharging into POTW and secondary treatment 
for POTW), where failure to meet the deadline is caused by the inability of the POTW to 
complete necessary construction. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1982). Given the nature of these two 
modifications, which are aimed mainly at POTW's, it is unlikely that the modifications would 
affect toxic pollutants. Although the unlikelihood of their applicability may explain their not 
being mentioned, it does not vitiate the legal possibility of their application. More importantly, 
section 301(k) provides for an extension of the 1984 BAT deadline for a discharger who will 
undertake the use of innovative production processes or control techniques which have the 
potential for industry-wide application. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1982). While section 301(k) does 
not use the term "modification" or "modify," as do sections 30l(c), (g), (h), and (i), this purely 
semantic distinction should be no reason to exempt section 301(k) from the prohibition of 
section 301(Z). 
157 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 
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reviewing an agency's construction of a statute. 158 The next question 
is whether the agency's construction of its statute is a permissible 
one. 
B. Consistency With the Statutory Scheme 
To determine the permissibility of an agency's interpretation of 
its statute, the majority in Chemical Manufacturers looks to "the 
goals and operation of the statutory scheme" to determine if they 
would be frustrated by the possibility of FDF variances for toxic 
pollutants. 159 The Court's analysis is based on the question of 
whether the FDF variance is more like an exception to an otherwise 
uniform rule, or whether it is more like a rule that merely happens 
to apply to a universe of one. The Court found that EPA consistently 
characterized the variance as "an individualized ... standard,"160 
and not a waiver of the Act's requirements. Moreover, NRDC con-
ceded that EPA could promulgate a rule creating a subcategory for 
an individual source "fundamentally different" from the other 
sources in the basic category.161 This would have the "same result" 
as issuing an FDF variance. Consequently, the Court found that the 
FDF variances were not inconsistent with the Act's goal of uniform 
effluent limitations. 162 Furthermore, because the grounds for an FDF 
158 The Court in Chevron sets forth the two questions: 
[w lhen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, 
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue .... 9 If however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute 
9 ••• If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains 
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the 
law and must be given effect. 
Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes other than footnote 9 omitted). 
159 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110. 
160 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,893 (1979). Actually, EPA was not so consistent. In its brief in 
du Pont, EPA had characterized the FDF variance as similar to the section 301(c) "variance." 
See Brief of Administrator, EPA, supra note 60. 
161 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1111. 
162 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1111-12. In reaching this conclusion, the Court leaned 
heavily on the equivalency between an FDF variance, which NRDC denied could be issued 
with respect to toxic effluents, and a rule applicable to only one source as a special subcategory. 
The Court wrote that "an FDF variance ... represents an acknowledgment that ... those 
relevant factors, properly considered, would have justified - indeed, required - the creation 
of a subcategory for the discharger in question." Id. at 1110. While there are some grounds 
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variance were completely different from the grounds for a section 
301(c) or section 301(g) modification,l63 the section 301(Z) legislative 
policy against those modifications did not necessarily apply to FDF 
variances. 164 
Finally, the Court invoked the "enormous burden" and the "strin-
gent timetables" under which EPA labored to set the effluent limi-
tations. 165 The Court was sensitive as well to the "large amounts of 
technical information" that needed to be analyzed. 166 EPA might 
"understandably" therefore fail to consider unique factors applicable 
to atypical plants, and thus the flexibility provided by the FDF 
variance was "important. "167 Such flexibility, the Court hypothe-
sized, might even have been intended by Congress in order to assure 
the validity of the categorical regulations. 168 Such a possibility is 
reasonable, the Court implied, because Congress might have be-
lieved that variances were required by due process,169 or that vari-
ances increased the likelihood that categorical regulations would be 
upheld. 170 
for this statement by the Court, e.g., the similarity of the factors to be considered in granting 
an FDF variance and the factors described in section 304(b), they are not unassailable. 
Apparently, EPA has never directly made such an assertion. Moreover, nothing in the Act 
suggests that different subcategories can be established only if their factors are "fundamentally 
different." More importantly, the Court ignored the procedural differences between the two 
different alternatives. As the dissent suggests, the choice of procedural mode might have 
substantive impacts. See 105 S. Ct. at 1123-24. Instead, the Court concluded that, because 
the argument was reduced to one over the means by which the decision was reached, rather 
than the power to achieve the end, it was particularly appropriate to defer to the agency 
choice. See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1111, (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978), and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 
(1974». 
163 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
164 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1111. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. 
167 [d. at 1112. 
168 [d. at 1112 n.25. 
169 The Court cited United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 755 
(1972); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting 
Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956). See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1112 n.25. The Court's 
statement does not withstand scrutiny. Not one of the cited cases mentions due process, much 
less rests its decision on it. The fact that the Court is, without attribution, virtually quoting 
from Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L.J. 938, 943 n.21 (1984), 
does not make the statement any more authoritative. 
170 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1112 n.25. The Court cited two cases for the proposition 
that some courts had found the FDF variance critical to the promulgation of treatment 
requirements. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1979); 
Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1040-41. However, both cases post-date the 1977 amendments 
and, therefore, could not have been considered by Congress. 
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The Court's analysis of the goals and operation of the statute is 
simplistic at best; at worst, it is disingenuous. It is difficult to find 
a single statement by the Court regarding any of the Act's goals or 
operation, other than the "goal of uniform effluent limitations under 
the Act."171 Indeed, the Court in its discussion of goals and opera-
tions of the Act, nowhere even mentions toxic materials, the very 
focus of section 301(l), much less discusses the purpose of that pro-
vision. One may concede that Congress, in enacting section 301(l), 
did not specifically intend to affect FDF variances. However, the 
necessary next question must be whether, by the enactment of sec-
tion 301(l), Congress clearly expressed an intent that was inconsis-
tent with granting FDF variances. 172 This question simply cannot 
be answered without addressing the purpose of section 301(l). 
The dissent in Chemical Manufacturers does address this ques-
tion. 173 Justice Marshall notes that the control of toxic pollutants 
was one of the highest priorities of the 1977 amendments. 174 Section 
301(l), at the least, imposed restrictions on certain modifications 
applicable to toxic effluents that had not existed prior to its passage. 
Moreover, the statutory scheme clearly indicated that, where toxic 
effluents were involved, neither the economic affordability nor the 
quality of receiving water were relevant considerations. The dissent 
continues: 
If these two modifications [sections 301(c) and (g)] are the only 
ones now prohibited, the result is wholly counterintuitive. EPA 
is in effect contending that economic and water quality factors 
present the most compelling case for modification of the standard 
in the nontoxic context - as they are explicitly authorized by 
statute - but the least compelling case for modification in the 
toxic context - as they are the only modifications prohibited by 
§ 301(l).175 
171 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110. It is arguable whether the uniformity of effluent 
limitations is a goal of the statute or only an important means to accomplishing the statute's 
goals. 
172 Given the Court's references to Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2778, one could interpret the 
Court's failure even to attempt a determination of section 301(l)'s general intent on the grounds 
that such a judicial reading of the legislative tea leaves is inappropriate - that, in the absence 
of a specific legislative intent with respect to FDF variances, the agency's determination is 
binding if rational. [d. at 2783. The fact that the Court purports to address whether the FDF 
variance frustrated the "goals and operation of the statutory scheme" suggests, however, that 
the Court was not willing to go so far. Thus, the question whether an agency's construction 
is "permissible" depends in part upon its consistency with the goals of the statutory scheme. 
173 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
174 [d. at 1116. 
175 [d. at 1117. 
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In short, according to the dissent, because toxic effluents "cause 
death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, 
physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) 
or physical deformations,"176 it would be inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the 1977 amendments to weaken categorical standards ap-
plicable to toxic effluents. 
The central purpose of the 1977 amendments, which tightened the 
statutory scheme with respect to toxics,177 provides the context for 
the legislative comments regarding section 301(l). These comments 
indicated that no waivers were available for toxics. 178 The Court is 
undoubtedly right in its conclusion that the speakers did not have a 
clear distinction in their minds between variances, waivers, and 
modifications. 179 Often these comments specifically addressed sec-
tions 301(c) and (g) modifications. Nonetheless, in light of the pur-
pose and goals of the 1977 amendments with respect to toxics, Con-
gress' consistent, categorical denial of any individualized exceptions 
from the toxic effluent limitations is necessarily inconsistent with 
FDF variances for toxics. 
This inconsistency is the strongest argument against the Court's 
decision. It should be sufficient to rebut the Court's conclusion, even 
under its own criteria for decision. The Court's own analysis was 
based on the question of whether an FDF variance for toxic pollu-
tants would be inconsistent with the goals and operation of the 
statutory scheme. However, EPA argues that whatever intent Con-
gress may have had with respect to "exceptions" for toxics, it did 
not intend to limit EPA's ability to tailor its rules to subcategories 
of dischargers of toxic effluents in light of the statutory factors. 
Thus, according to EPA, the FDF variance is not inconsistent with 
the statutory scheme because it is functionally indistinguishable from 
such tailoring. The dissent denies that particularized rules, which 
all concede are allowed, are equivalent to FDF variances. 
176 C.W.A. § 502(13), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982). 
177 In general, the 1977 amendments tightened the statutory scheme with respect to toxics; 
however, in certain respects, the amendments may be viewed as loosening it. For example, 
the amendments allowed BAT limitations for toxic pollutants as an alternative to health-based 
effluent standards. While this facilitated the creation of toxic pollutant limitations, it authorized 
a potentially lower level of protection. Also, the standard for pretreatment of toxic waste 
from sources discharging into POTW's was relaxed in those instances where the POTW 
removes all or part of the toxics. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 54, 91 Stat. 1566,1591 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1317(b)(I) (1982». 
178 See supra note 135. 
179 See supra text accompanying note 131. Apparently, EPA itself was sometimes subject 
to such verbal lapses. See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1127 n.22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
See also supra note 130. 
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The most readily apparent distinction is in the procedure appli-
cable to a permit proceeding, in which the FDF variance is granted, 
and a rulemaking. While acknowledging that normally a choice be-
tween proceeding by adjudication or by rule making is left to the 
discretion of an agency, here, the dissent stated, "Congress attached 
great substantive significance to the method used for establishing 
pollution control requirements. "180 Thus, according to the dissent, 
Congress intentionally chose rule making to set an effluent limitation 
for a subcategory in order to further particular purposes. To allow 
the effluent limitation to be set by adjudication, even for a subcat-
egory of one, would be inconsistent with that intent and purpose. 
To support this claim, the dissent uses both legislative history and 
a structural analysis. Its legislative history, however, consists of 
little more than generalized congressional statements regarding the 
need or desirability for the Administrator to consider the various 
section 304(b) factors, and especially economic impacts on plants, 
only in terms of classes and categories of point sources, not on a 
plant-by-plant basis. 181 This history, much of which had been used 
by the Court in du Pont to justify setting effluent limitations by 
regulation,182 is not a strong argument in rebuttal to the supposed 
equivalency between an FDF variance and a particularized rulemak-
ing. First, none of the cited history distinguishes between rulemak-
ing and adjudication in terms of procedure; the entire thrust is that 
the Administrator should deal with classes and categories rather 
than individual plants. Thus, the history is simply non-responsive to 
the argument that an FDF variance granted in a permit proceeding 
is functionally the same as an effluent limitation established by ru-
lemaking for a subcategory of one plant, which the dissent concedes 
is possible under the Act. Second, the legislative history, even if 
accepted for the purpose suggested by the dissent, simply proves 
too much. If the various statements cited by the dissent intended to 
indicate a congressional intent to prohibit EPA from setting or re-
vising standards on an individual basis, then the statements are 
directly at odds, not only with sections 301(c) and (g)'s express 
modification procedures, but also with the variance required by the 
Court in du Pont as a condition for setting BPT standards by reg-
ulation. Rather, the statements are more correctly read to reflect 
the normal method of proceeding, not the exceptional. 
180 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1122 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
181 Id. at 1122-23. 
182 See du Pont, 430 U.S. at 129--30. 
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The dissent's structural analysis fares no better. The dissent be-
gins by noting that Congress intended EPA to set the BPT and BAT 
levels by reference to "the average of the best existing performance 
by plants . . . within each industrial category" and "the best per-
former in an industrial category," respectively.183 If a polluter is 
granted an FDF variance, it receives an effluent limitation based on 
its peculiar situation, not based on the "average of the best" or the 
"best" performer. The result is less protection of the environment 
and, because the limitation is less demanding of the polluter, less 
incentive to technological innovation. 184 This analysis and conclusion 
again, however, apply equally to an FDF variance and a rulemaking 
for a subcategory of one. The dissent recognizes this,185 but suggests 
that in a rulemaking EPA would at least have established that the 
discharger was indeed uniquely situated. If, instead, there were 
other dischargers similarly situated with lower compliance costs, 
then the limitation would be set based on their circumstances (as 
the "average of the best" or the "best"), rather than on the one, 
high-cost discharger. In this regard, the dissent states that, under 
the FDF variance procedure, "there is no mechanism for EPA to 
ascertain whether there are any other dischargers in [the same] 
position. "186 Indeed, because initial determinations are usually made 
by states,187 the dissent says the procedure "is unlikely to lead to 
the identification of new subcategories. "188 
This theoretical analysis suffers from several weaknesses. First, 
there is no particular "mechanism" in rulemaking to assure, or even 
to induce, similarly situated dischargers with lower compliance costs 
to come forward. While rulemaking assures public notice through 
the Federal Register, if EPA were proposing a subcategory defined 
in a manner applicable equally to the known high-cost polluter and 
unknown low-cost polluters, the low-cost polluters might well lay 
low and obtain the benefit of an effluent limitation set on the basis 
of the high-cost polluter. 189 Second, the procedures governing FDF 
1R3 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1123 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Senator Muskie, 
at 118 CONGo REc. 33,696 (1972)). See also 38 Fed. Reg. 21,202-03 (1973). 
"4 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). By requiring the 
"average of the best" and the "best" technology, the Act "forces" technology. ld. 
185 ld. at 1124. 
186 I d. at 1123. 
187 The FDF variance proceeding is initially conducted by the state, if it has been delegated 
the authority to implement the permit system. Most states have been delegated such authority. 
If the state proposes to grant the variance, it is then reviewed by EPA. See supra note 32. 
188 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1123 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
189 It is, however, entirely possible that, if they were competitors with the high cost pollu-
1985] FDF VARIANCES 39 
variances themselves provide for public notice to potentially inter-
ested persons, as well as an opportunity for them to comment. l90 
Thus, to the extent that notice-and-comment is a "mechanism" in 
rulemaking to ascertain if there are similarly situated dischargers, 
it also exists in the FDF variance procedure. 191 Third, it is highly 
unlikely that similarly situated dischargers would be overlooked by 
EPA, even if they did not identify themselves. 192 Since all FDF 
variance requests must be made within a relatively narrow time 
period,193 the identification of like requestors is facilitated. Moreover, 
the specific information contained in the request identifies similar 
plants to EPA specialists. 194 Fourth, even though the FDF procedure 
lacks a mechanism to group like dischargers, and thereby "force 
technology" within that group, EPA is not denied the ability to 
establish such a subcategory. Categorical effluent limitations would 
then apply to such subcategories, rather than individual FDF vari-
ances. Finally, and most significantly, the possibility that a number 
of plants in a category would all have fundamentally different factors 
from the plants considered by EPA in that category, and yet still be 
ters, they would seek to have the effluent limitations set at levels acceptable to them but not 
to the high-cost polluter. Such a factual possibility, however, hardly seems to rise to the level 
of a mechanism to assure identification of similar plants. 
190 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.31(a)(3), 403. 13(j) (1984). 
191 National organizations, such as the NRDC, Sierra Club, and National Wildlife Federa-
tion, usually prefer agency rulemaking to establish rules of behavior rather than particularized 
adjudications. Their limited resources can best be used when targeted against broadscale 
agency action. The more atomized and localized the action, the less able such groups are to 
monitor them or to justify the expenditure of scarce resources. On the other hand, local groups 
seem more likely to be involved and to make input where the issue is local rather than national. 
Thus, it would seem that it is not the procedure as much as the narrow scope of the action 
that determines the relative interests of national or local groups. If this is so, the choice of 
individual permit proceedings or rulemakings for subclasses of one would not appear to bear 
on the extent of public participation. 
192 While states may make the initial review of FDF variances, the state determination, if 
favorable to the requester, is forwarded to EPA as a recommendation. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 
§ 403.13(k) (1984). 
193 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(g) (1984) generally requires all requests to be made within 180 
days of the effective date of the categorical pretreatment standards. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(l)(1) 
generally requires that all requests for FDF variances from NPDES permits be made by the 
close of the public comment period under 40 C.F.R. § 124.10, which is "at least 30 cjays after" 
the issuance of a draft EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 124.1O(b). In the case of a decision not to issue an 
EIS, FDF variance requests must be made "at least 30 days" after public notice of the draft 
permit. 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(b). On September 25, 1985, EPA adopted a rule reinstituting the 
FDF variance declared unlawful by the Third Circuit, in light of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Chemical Mfrs. See 50 Fed. Reg. 38,809 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13). This 
rule specifies the new time limits for seeking FDF variances for those persons whose deadline 
for filing a variance request expired after the Third Circuit's decision. See id. at 38,810. 
194 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 403. 13(h) (1984). 
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similarly situated to each other, seems so remote that the general 
possibility of FDF variances should not turn on it. Indeed, there is 
no indication that such a situation has ever arisen in the past. 
In addition to its argument based on the legislative history and 
structure of the Act, the dissent also used a theoretical approach to 
deny that the FDF variance is equivalent to a particularized rule. 195 
The approach drew heavily on a number of scholarly works analyzing 
the nature of exceptions to regulatory rules. 196 The dissent intended 
to present a functional definition of an exception in order to label 
the FDF variance as necessarily an "exception" for legal purposes. 
By so categorizing the FDF variance, the dissent intended to bring 
the FDF variance within the umbrella of the "modifications" prohib-
ited by section 301(l), which would analytically be categorized as 
"exceptions." This argument was also responsive to the majority's 
emphasis, if not reliance, on the FDF variance being more like a 
rule applicable to a category of one than it is an exception from a 
generally applicable rule. 197 
The dissent discussed two functional types of exceptions identified 
by the commentators:198 hardship exceptions and fairness exceptions. 
The modification in section 301(c) is an example of a hardship excep-
tion, because it relieves a single plant from compliance when the 
general rule would create an economic hardship. The FDF variance 
is a fairness exception because it relieves an obligation that would 
otherwise involve a disproportionate share of the regulatory bur-
den. 199 Thus, according to the dissent, because the FDF variance 
fits within the typology of exceptions, it is an exception to a rule, 
not a particularized rule. 200 
At one level, this argument is nothing but semantics - if it is an 
exception to a rule, it cannot be a rule. At this level, the argument 
195 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1124-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did 
not join the dissent on this approach, saying that it was not necessary because the language 
and history of the Act were sufficient to indicate the error of the Court's interpretation. ld. 
at 1128 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
196 The works cited by the dissent are: Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative 
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Aman, Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions 
to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277; Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next 
Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983); Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory 
Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 163; Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L.J. 938 (1984). 
197 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
198 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1126 n.21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
199 Several statutes provide for exceptions based on "special hardship, inequity, or unfair 
distribution of burdens," reflecting a congressional understanding of these different types of 
exceptions. See, e.g., Department of Energy Reorganization Act, 41 U.S.C. § 7194(a). 
200 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1127 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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is no more than an ipse dixit. On another level, the argument pro-
vides a framework or vocabulary for describing and thinking about 
regulatory activity. However, it does not further the dissent's case, 
because it does not distinguish "exceptions" from "rules," either in 
terms of their procedure, or in terms of their definition under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.201 At this level, even a particularized 
rule would be considered an "exception." The dissent and NRDC 
conceded that a bona fide revision of a toxic effluent standard to 
create a new subcategory applicable to one discharger would be valid 
under the Act. Consequently, while the dissent's theoretical attack 
on the equivalence between an FDF variance and a particularized 
rule was perhaps more sophisticated than its other attacks, it ulti-
mately fails as well. 
In the midst of its other arguments, the dissent loses sight of 
perhaps its best argument on this point. No doubt, where Congress 
has granted authority to an agency to proceed either by adjudication 
or by rule making , the determination of the proper method of pro-
ceeding is left to the judgment of the agency, perhaps subject to 
review for abuse of discretion. This is certainly the teaching of 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace CO.,202 which was cited by the Court.203 
The Clean Water Act, however, does not authorize EPA to set or 
revise pretreatment standards for toxic effluents by adjudication. To 
the contrary, the Act provides that they are to be set by regula-
tion. 204 Not only is there no express authority to proceed by adju-
dication, there is an express prohibition against "modifications" of 
requirements pertaining to toxic pollutants. 205 Thus, the case law 
supporting deference to an agency's choice between equally available 
means of proceeding206 is simply inapplicable here. The power to 
proceed by adjudication was not granted to the agency,207 and the 
power to grant exceptions to toxic standards was expressly denied. 
201 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1982). 
202 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974). See also SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
203 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1111. The Court also cites Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978), for the same point. See 105 S. Ct. at 1111. There, 
however, the issue was not whether a court should review the choice between rulemaking 
and adjudication, but whether a court should determine what procedures should be applicable 
to rulemaking, beyond those required by statute. The Court held that, so long as the agency 
complied with the procedural requirements imposed by statute, it was for the agency and not 
the courts to impose or not to impose any additional procedures. 
204 See C.W.A. § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). 
205 See C.W.A. § 301(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l)(1982). 
206 See supra note 202. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. The dissent notes that all the arguments used 
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The deference recognized in Bell Aerospace, Chenery, Wyman-
Gordon,208 and Vermont Yankee209 is not unlike the deference rec-
ognized in Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC.210 The deference accorded an 
agency decision depends on the explicit or implicit delegation by 
Congress to the agency. In the first line of cases a delegation of 
power is made with respect to the type of proceeding and procedure 
to be used. In Chevron, the delegation is to determine the substan-
tive scope of the statutory language. In the circumstances of Chem-
ical Manufacturers, it is difficult to find any similar delegation with 
respect to setting pretreatment standards for toxic effluents by ad-
judication. The statute expressly provides for categorical rulemaking 
for pretreatment standards and toxic effluent limitations, not for 
limitations set by adjudication. In fact, the express prohibition on 
modifications in section 301(l) reinforces the legislative intent to deny 
particularized adjudications that weaken standards for toxic ef-
fluents. That a functionally similar result - a toxic effluent limitation 
applicable to one plant - might be achieved by rulemaking, as well 
as by adjudication, is not a basis for recognizing a power, or for 
deferring to an agency's claim of power, to proceed in a manner 
clearly not authorized by Congress. 
The dissent's last argument deserves mention because it directly 
relates to the underlying justification for all FDF variances. The 
Court found that Congress' silence with respect to the variances was 
evidence that Congress did not intend to affect them when enacting 
section 301(Z). The dissent attacks that analysis on the grounds that 
the variance the Court required in du Pont was premised on the 
agency adopting categorical standards when the statutory scheme 
called for regulation of individual point sources. 211 Moreover in du 
Pont, the Court had found that a variance was not authorized with 
respect to the new source standards, which under the statutory 
scheme were to be adopted in categorical regulations. The dissent 
synthesizes these decisions and concludes that: variances are re-
quired only where the statute calls for regulation by adjudication 
but the agency proceeds by rule; and variances are prohibited where 
by the Court in du Pont for denying the possibility of a variance from the new source standards 
would apply here as well. Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1126 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
208 See supra note 202. 
209 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
210 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 
211 "Both the facts and the rationale of this portion of du Pont are of relevance only to cases 
in which EPA issues categorical standards in the face of a statutory scheme that calls for 
regulation of 'point sources.'" Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1119 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the statute requires categorical limitations by rulemaking. Thus, by 
enacting section 301(Z), Congress would have had no reason to ad-
dress the variances required in du Pont, because section 301(Z) was 
applicable only to requirements involving toxic pollutants, which 
were in all cases to be categorical regulations applicable to "a class 
or category of point sources. "212 Given du Pont's conclusion with 
respect to new source standards, variances from limitations with 
respect to toxic effluents would be similarly inappropriate. 
As an argument for why Congress did not address the du Pont 
variances when it enacted section 301(Z), the dissent's analysis suf-
fers from the same weaknesses as the Court's. They both assume 
congressional knowledge and awareness of the du Pont variance -
knowledge and awareness for which there is virtually no evidence. 213 
In fact, the dissent's speculation as to congressional knowledge is 
even more unlikely because it presumes that Congress understood 
the underlying rationale for, and the scope of, the du Pont variance. 
The former, however, was not addressed by the Court in du Pont. 
Furthermore, the latter was not known until Crushed Stone was 
decided, and that decision came after the adoption of section 301(Z).214 
Nevertheless, if the dissent is correct in its interpretation of the 
rationale for the du Pont variance requirement, it suggests that 
FDF variances from BAT, BCT, or pretreatment standards gener-
ally are not authorized, even if the variances are not specifically 
prohibited with respect to toxic pollutants by section 301(Z). This is 
212 Under the Act, effluent limitations applicable to toxic pollutants for existing point sources 
other than POTW's may be set either under section 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A); 
or section 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982). In either case, the statutory language 
describes the effluent limitations as applicable to a "category or class of point sources" or 
"categories and classes of point sources." Under section 301(b)(2)(A), the limitation is based 
on technological factors" i.e., "best available technology economically achievable" as deter-
mined in accordance with section 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2) (1982). Under section 
307(a)(2), EPA may set a stricter limitation for toxic pollutants than the one which would 
apply under section 301(b)(2)(A). This limitation, which may be a prohibition, is set based on 
the particular characteristics of the particular toxic pollutant and the characteristics of the 
particular organisms affected by it, rather than on technological considerations. 
In Chemical Mfrs., the toxic limitation did not arise under either of these provisions. These 
provisions are only applicable to discharges by point sources into navigable waters. The toxic 
limitation arose under section 307(b), which requires pretreatment standards for discharges 
into POTW's. 105 S. Ct. at 1105. This section expressly states that the standards are to be 
set by regulation applicable to categories of sources. As the dissent notes, while EPA set the 
pretreatment standards at BPT and BAT levels pursuant to a consent decree, see supra note 
118, it did so by regulation pursuant to section 307(b), not a statutory scheme that called for 
individualized determinations. 105 S. Ct. at 1120 n.13. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 142-52. 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 136-41. 
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so, because under the Act, BAT, BCT, and pretreatment standards 
are applicable by their terms to a class or category of point sources 
or are expressly set by regulation. 215 They do not apply directly to 
"point sources,"216 as is the case with BPT limitations. 
C. Applying Chevron 
The Court's conclusion that section 301(l) does not prohibit FDF 
variances from toxic effluent limitations turns on the fact that EPA 
had reached that conclusion in promulgating its FDF variance reg-
ulation. A long line of Supreme Court cases stands for the principle 
that when a court is called upon to review an agency's interpretation 
of a statute it administers, the court should defer to the agency's 
interpretation.217 In a sense, Chevron was just the latest in that line 
of cases. However, Chevron went further, by specifying two ques-
tions courts should ask in applying the principle. 218 The first question 
is whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question at issue. 
If it did, that intent is given effect without regard to the agency's 
interpretation.219 If, however, Congress was silent or ambiguous on 
the issue, then the question for the court is only whether the agency's 
interpretation is permissible. Here deference comes into play.220 A 
potential danger of this two question approach is that courts will 
insist too strictly on unambiguous expressions of legislative intent 
as to the precise issue, with the result that otherwise clear expres-
sions of the intent of Congress may be ignored. If courts will not 
police agencies in their fidelity to the intent of Congress, an impor-
tant check in the separation of powers will be lost. 
The dissent in Chemical Manufacturers purports to agree with 
the majority in its reading of Chevron's standard for judicial review 
of an agency's construction of its statute. 221 The dissent says that it 
disagrees instead with the majority's analysis of section 301(l) and 
its legislative history.222 However, it is not clear that the dissent and 
the majority do in fact read Chevron in the same manner. The 
majority focuses on the issue of whether Congress had a specific, 
215 See C.W.A. §§ 301(b)(2)(A), (E), 33 U.S.C. §§ 13ll(b)(2)(A), (E); C.W.A. § 307(b), 33 
U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1982). 
216 See C.W.A. § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 13ll(b)(1)(A) (1982). 
217 See cases cited in Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n.14. 
218 See Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 2782 n.ll. 
221 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1121 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
=Id. 
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particular intent to prohibit FDF variances in enacting section 301(l). 
The dissent does not seriously contest the conclusion that Congress 
did not have such an intent since Congress' ignorance of FDF vari-
ances in general, and their relationship to the variance required in 
du Pont in particular, makes a specific intent on the subject simply 
impossible. The difference between the majority and dissent, how-
ever, arises from the fact that, at this point, the majority ends its 
analysis of the legislative intent, whereas the dissent continues by 
assessing the general intent behind section 301(l). For the majority, 
the absence of specific intent with respect to FDF variances answers 
the first question that Chevron says the Court is to ask;223 for the 
dissent it does not. For the dissent, the clear intent of Congress 
generally with respect to section 301(l), even if Congress had no 
specific knowledge of FDF variances, suffices under Chevron to 
answer positively the question of whether Congress had "directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. "224 
After Chevron, some commentators questioned whether full effect 
would be given to its emphasis on specific intent and precise ques-
tions, which made Chevron stand out from the long line of otherwise 
similar cases involving judicial deference to agency constructions of 
their own statutes. 225 Certainly, the decision in Chemical Manufac-
turers indicates that the Court's emphasis in Chevron bore fruit. 
Indeed, Chemical Manufacturers may go a step further. In Chevron, 
the Court found that the general legislative intent of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments was of two minds: to clean the air and to allow 
reasonable economic growth. The Court found these to be "mani-
festly competing interests. "226 One commentator writing about the 
specific legislative intent noted that "[i]t is difficult to imagine that 
anyone who is not paid to take the advocate's role could review the 
Clean Air Act and its history and declare that Congress intended 
anything regarding the [particular] definition [in question]."227 The 
Court in Chevron noted several possible explanations for the lack of 
such a specific intent,228 but concluded that "[f]or judicial purposes, 
223 See supra note 158. 
224 Chevron, 104 s. Ct. at 278l. 
225 See, e.g., DeLong, The Bubble Case, AD. L. NEWS, Fall 1984, at 1, 6-7. 
226 Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793. 
227 Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst EPA's Bubble 
Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285, 321 (1985). 
228 The Court noted that "[p]erhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to 
strike the balance at this level ... ; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this 
level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question 
.... " Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793. 
46 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:1 
it matters not which of these things occurred. "229 In the context of 
the law at issue in Chevron, such a conclusion may have been well 
taken, because there was not only an absence of specific intent, but 
a confusion as to the general intent. Thus, one could not answer with 
any confidence the question - if Congress had thought of this issue, 
what would have been its intent.23o In Chemical Manufacturers, 
however, the Court simply fails to address the issue of the general 
intent of section 301(l) or of the 1977 Amendments with respect to 
toxic pollutants. In the Court's view, the absence of a specific intent 
eliminates the need for further analysis of intent. If the Court in 
Chemical Manufacturers correctly applies (or extends) Chevron by 
ignoring general intent whenever there is an absence of specific 
congressional intent, meaningful judicial review of agencies' con-
struction of their statutes will be significantly decreased. This is 
because there are few meaningful legal disputes where Congress has 
"directly addressed the precise question at issue" in a statute or its 
legislative history.231 If it had, the disputants would probably not 
waste time in court. While there are circumstances when it is ap-
propriate to defer to an agency's construction of its statute, defer-
ence whenever Congress has not specifically foreclosed or required 
agency action would be a virtual abandonment of the judicial function 
in reviewing agency action. 
In Marbury v. Madison, 232 Chief Justice Marshall made the famous 
statement that it is the province and duty of the courts to say what 
the law is, notwithstanding the fact that the case involved a review 
of an administrative action. Nevertheless, it is appropriate for courts 
to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own statute when Con-
gress has delegated that authority to the agency. If Congress has 
by statute delegated lawmaking authority to an agency, that dele-
229 [d. 
230 See supra note 228. Of the Court's three explanations in Chevron for why Congress may 
not have addre~sed the precise issue, only one - the failure to consider the issue at all -
poses serious problems in terms of undermining Congress' general intent. If Congress desired 
to have the Administrator strike the balance, then to defer to the agency is to conform to the 
intent of Congress. If the failure to address the issue arose from the inability to forge a 
coalition on either side of the issue, this is evidence that the general intent does not extend 
to this issue. If, however, Congress was simply unaware of the issue, whether the general 
intent comprehends and addresses that issue should be assessed by the court. Perhaps in 
certain cases the court cannot say with confidence what Congress would have intended had it 
known of the issue. In these cases, the court may defer to the agency if its construction is 
permissible or reasonable. See Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. In other cases, however, it will 
be relatively clear what the intent would be, and the court should then find "that intention is 
the law and must be given effect." Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9. 
231 Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. 
232 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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gation may include the authority to define or construe the terms of 
that statute. The role of the courts is not to second-guess such a 
definition or construction, anymore than it is to second-guess any 
exercise of the agency's delegated authority. Rather, the role of the 
courts is to determine what authority Congress delegated. In making 
this determination, courts should not readily defer to an agency's 
interpretation. The essence of the separation of powers is that one 
branch cannot itself define the scope of its powers.233 In Chemical 
Manufacturers, the Court should have assessed Congress' general 
intent with respect to section 301(l), as well as to toxics generally. 
The Court would have found a clear congressional intent to eliminate 
any basis upon which EPA could grant special or extraordinary 
consideration to toxic polluters. Therefore, unlike the situation in 
Chevron, one can with confidence answer the question, what would 
CongTess have intended had it thought of the issue. It would have 
prohibited FDF variances for toxic pollutants. 
Ultimately, the holding of Chemical Manufacturers is narrow: 
section 301(l) does not prohibit FDF variances. The Court pointedly 
did not address the validity of the actual FDF variance regulations 
applicable to pretreatment standards. 234 Thus, the possibility re-
mains that even though section 301(l) does not prohibit variances, 
they simply are unauthorized with respect to these standards. It is 
to this issue that we now turn. 
IV. STATUS OF THE VARIANCES 
In Chemical Manufacturers, the variance procedure in question 
applied to pretreatment standards, and as discussed earlier, pre-
treatment standards are expressly required to be set by regula-
tion. 235 In fact, the statutory provision even specifies some of the 
rulemaking procedures. 236 If the dissent's analysis of du Pont is 
correct, the fact that the statutory scheme calls for categorical reg-
ulations rather than particularized determinations, might be of crit-
ical importance. In du Pont, despite what the Court said,237 it might 
be argued that the only real distinction between the BPT limitations 
and the new source standards was that the former were to apply to 
233 See generally Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1983). 
234 See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1107 n.13. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.30,403.13 (1984). 
235 C.W.A. § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). 
236 [d. A proposed rule must be published; opportunity for public hearing must be provided; 
within ninety days of the proposed rule's publication, the final rule must be published. 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 62-75. 
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"point sources,"238 indicating particularized determinations, whereas 
the latter were expressly categorical regulations. 239 With respect to 
the former, the Court held that variances were required; with re-
spect to the latter, where the statute provided for limitations by 
categorical regulation, the Court stated that a variance would be 
"inappropriate."24o Thus, FDF variances should also be inappropriate 
with respect to the pretreatment standards, which are to be set by 
categorical regulations. Moreover, while Chemical Manufacturers 
directly involved only pretreatment standards, EPA has by regula-
tion also provided for FDF variances from both BAT and BCT 
limitations. 241 These limitations are also set by categorical regula-
tions pursuant to statutory provisions that require regulations and 
not particularized determinations. 242 Consequently, if the dissent's 
analysis of du Pont is correct, these variance provisions would also 
be "inappropriate." 
There are, however, problems with using the dissent's analysis in 
this way. First, the Court has never acknowledged that the du Pont 
variance requirement turned on the presence of a statutory scheme 
calling for individualized regulation through particularized permits, 
rather than for categorical rules applicable to all subject to their 
terms. Indeed, the Court in du Pont justified the setting of BPT 
limitations by categorical rules precisely because the statutory 
scheme envisioned such rules and not individualized determina-
tions. 243 
Second, to read the du Pont prohibition against variances with 
respect to new source standards so broadly as to apply generally 
whenever categorical regulations are called for by a statutory 
scheme is inconsistent with judicial opinions as well as scholarly 
commentary.244 While there are certainly statutes the particular his-
238 C.W.A. § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1982). 
239 See id. 
240 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
241 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.30-.32 (1984). 
242 While neither section 301(b)(2)(A) nor section 301(b)(2)(E) by its terms requires a regu-
lation, each is phrased in terms of applying to "categories and classes of point sources." In du 
Pont, the Court found this language to provide "unambiguously" for the use of regulations. 
See du Pont, 430 U.S. at 126. 
243 "In sum, the language of the statute supports the view that § 301 limitations are to be 
adopted by the Administrator, that they are to be based primarily on classes and categories, 
and that they are to take the form of regulations." du Pont, 430 U.S. at 129. 
244 See in addition to the cases listed infra notes 248-49, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum 
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972) (agency can create exceptions to its own rules). See also in 
addition to the commentators listed supra note 196, E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY 
THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). Cf. ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 315-17 (H. Rackman trans. 1926) ("[Wlhen ... the law lays down a 
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tory of which compel a conclusion that Congress intended no excep-
tions to the general regulation,245 the Court has stated the general 
rule that "an agency's authority to proceed in a complex area ... 
by means of rules of general application entails a concomitant au-
thority to provide exception procedures in order to allow for special 
circumstances. "246 
Third, the dissent's analysis of du Pont only reaches the question 
of when a variance procedure is required, not when a variance is 
merely authorized. The importance in du Pont of applying the BPT 
limitations to "point sources" is the possible inference that the 
agency was to consider the section 304(b)(1) factors in relation to 
each individual point source, rather than merely generically in re-
lation to categories and classes of point sources. Proceeding solely 
by individual adjudications is one way to accomplish individual con-
sideration. However, in an earlier line of regulatory cases, decided 
at a time when traditional regulatory agencies were shifting from 
adjudication to informal rulemaking as a means of making policy, 247 
the Court established that individual adjudication was not the only 
way to achieve this goal. Instead, where an agency had general 
rulemaking power, although the particular regulatory scheme called 
for decision by adjudication, the Court found that the agency could 
use rulemaking to decide generically issues that might arise in the 
adjudications. These rules would then be binding in subsequent ad-
judications where these issues were relevant. For example, in 
United States v. Storer Broadcasting CO.,248 the FCC adopted a rule 
providing that television broadcast licenses would not be granted to 
general rule and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right ... 
to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on 
the occasion."); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961) ("Hence justice is tradition-
ally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion, and its leading precept is 
often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike;' though we need to add to the latter 'and treat 
different cases differently.'''). In fairness to the dissent, to read du Pont for the proposition 
that variances are inappropriate whenever the statutory scheme calls for regulations would 
also be broader than what the dissent suggests. Its analysis was not that all regulations of 
general application were incompatible with exceptions, but rather that the statutory provision 
governing the new source standards was, like the Endangered Species Act, among those few 
statutes that admitted of no exception. See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1125-26 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
245 Often cited for this proposition is Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 
(1978), in which the Court found the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), 
to "admit of no exception." 
246 Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. at 755. 
247 See generally DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 
65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond the APA: Criteria for Trial-
type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1976). 
248 351 U. S. 192 (1956). 
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persons already owning five television stations. Since the statute 
required that an application for a license could only be denied after 
an adjudicatory hearing, Storer, which already owned five stations, 
asserted that the FCC could not determine the "public interest, 
convenience, or necessity" by categorical rule because in effect, the 
FCC would deny its application without the particularized adjudi-
cation. In upholding the FCC's rule, the Court made clear that the 
agency could decide such issues by categorical rules. Having made 
such a rule, however, the agency had not abandoned its continuing 
obligation to determine the "public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity" in the adjudication as required by the statute. The agency had 
also promulgated a rule enabling applicants to demonstrate why the 
mUltiple ownership regulation should be waived or amended. The 
FCC had therefore provided an exception procedure.249 The Court 
held that this exception procedure in which the applicant seeking 
exception bears the burden, satisfied the requirement for an adju-
dication. 250 
In du Pont, the Court faced a similar situation. The statutory 
scheme required each discharger to obtain a permit, and the statu-
tory requirement (BPT) had been specified by the agency in regu-
249 See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC regula-
tions prohibiting exclusive contracts between radio stations and national networks contrary 
to the public interest not arbitrary and capricious, because the FCC did not bind itself inflexibly 
to the regulations, but would still exercise its judgment in determining whether the grant of 
the license would serve the public interest); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 
33, 39-44 (1964) (the statutory requirement for a hearing under the Natural Gas Act did not 
preclude the Federal Power Commission from particularizing statutory standards through the 
rulemaking process and barring at the threshold those who neither measure up to the rules 
nor show reasons why the rule should be waived); American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics 
Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (the Civil Aeronautics Board's use of rulemaking to 
decide that only all-cargo carriers could reserve blocks of space for customers was sufficiently 
fair without the use of an adjudicatory hearing, since the regulation was intended to be subject 
to periodic reexamination), cen. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Note, The Agency Use of 
Rulemaking to Deny Adjudication Apparently Required by Statute, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1086 
(1969). 
250 Neither in this case nor in others did the Court expressly require an exception proceeding 
as a condition for regulating by rule rather than by adjudication. Moreover, the exception 
procedure itself was not necessarily the equivalent of the adjudicatory proceeding for which 
the rule substituted. Rather, it was either expressly or apparently the same as a petition for 
rulemaking. If a procedure for a petition for rulemaking would satisfy the "requirement" for 
an exception procedure, then the requirement would be meaningless, because the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act requires that agencies provide for petitions for rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(3) (1982). This may explain why later lower court cases in the Storer line simply ignore 
the issue of the presence or absence of an exception or variance procedure. See, e.g., National 
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding power of FTC to 
issue Trade Regulation rules under the general rulemaking powers rather than having to 
determine unfair trade practices only in the formal adjudications specifically provided for 
enforcing the Act), cen. denied, 515 U.S. 951 (1974). 
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lation. Thus, the language of du Pont stresses the support in the 
statute for proceeding by rule as opposed to adjudication, and 
thereby establishes the necessary authority for EPA to adopt a BPT 
limitation by regulation. In contrast, the requirement for a variance 
procedure could arise from an unstated but implicit recognition by 
the Court that the statutory scheme was similar to that in Storer 
and the other earlier cases. 251 If this were a correct understanding 
of du Pont, however, the du Pont requirement for a variance pro-
cedure is simply irrelevant to a statutory scheme that does not 
envision particularized determinations of effluent limitations. This 
interpretation of du Pont would thus be irrelevant to BAT, BCT, or 
pretreatment standards. 252 While this analysis of du Pont suggests 
an FDF variance is not required for BAT, BCT, and pretreatment 
standards, it simply does not address the question of whether an 
FDF variance is permitted. Thus, if one focuses on the dissent's 
analysis of du Pont's requirement for a variance, there is no support 
for or against the permissibility of variances from BAT, BCT, or 
pretreatment standards. 
As discussed earlier,253 the Court in du Pont held that variances 
from new source standards were "inappropriate" because it was 
"clear that Congress intended these regulations to be absolute pro-
hibitions. "254 Congress exhibited this intent in several ways: by "the 
use of the word 'standards;"'255 by setting the preferred standard at 
a zero discharge limitation; by making illegal the operation of any 
new source by any owner in violation of the standard; by the abgence 
of a statutory variance provision; and by the inappropriateness of a 
variance in a standard that was to ensure national uniformity and 
"maximum feasible control" of new sources. 256 
251 While the Court did not cite Storer et al. in its opinion and none of the parties cited them 
in the briefs relating to the BPT and BAT effluent limitations, du Pont utilized these cases in 
its brief to support the circuit court's requirement for a variance from the new source 
standards. See Reply brief of E.!. du Pont de Nemours, Docket Number 75-1473 and 75-1705, 
at 6-7, E.!. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). EPA responded by interpreting 
the cases as permitting, not requiring, exceptions from the general rules. See Brief of Ad-
ministrator, EPA, supra note 60. 
252 While an NPDES permit is required for all dischargers into "waters of the United States," 
because the statute expressly indicates that BAT and BCT limitations apply to classes or 
categories of sources, they are held not to be conceived as the result of particularized deter-
minations. Thus, the Storer similarity does not obtain. Also, the pretreatment standards are 
expressly regulations and apply directly as regulations without any NPDES permit, because 
these dischargers discharge into a POTW, not waters of the United States. 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 62-75. 
254 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
255 [d. 
256 [d. 
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If one uses this type of analysis, variances from the pretreatment 
standards would not appear appropriate. The word "standards," 
used in section 307(b), was found by the Court in du Pont to imply 
that the limitations were to be absolute prohibitions.257 Moreover, 
section 307(b) is phrased in terms of preventing "the discharge of 
any pollutant .... " This language is similar to the provision appli-
cable to new sources, "permitting discharge of no pollutants," which 
the Court found important in du Pont. 258 There is no statutory 
provision in section 307(b) for a variance,259 which was also a factor 
the Court found notable in du Pont. 260 In addition, the legislative 
history refers to the pretreatment standards as "national" standards, 
identical to the characterization of the new source standards ,261 
which the Court in du Pont interpreted as reflecting an intent "to 
insure national uniformity. "262 Finally, as with new source standards, 
it is unlawful for any owner of cmy source to operate any source in 
violation of a pretreatment standard.263 Consequently, on virtually 
every point, the pretreatment standards at issue in Chemical Man-
ufacturers match the indicia used by the Court in du Pont to indicate 
a clear congressional intent against variances. 
The similarity between the statutory scheme for the BAT and 
BCT limitations and for the new source standards provision is not 
as complete· as that for the pretreatment standards. There is, how-
ever, a substantial similarity. The preferred BAT effluent limitation 
is almost identically worded to that of the new source standards. 264 
257 [d. 
258 [d. Section 307(d) also makes it "unlawful for any owner or operator of any source to 
operate any source in violation of any ... pretreatment standard," language virtually identical 
to that quoted in du Pont from section 306(e). See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) (1982). 
269 There is, however, one possible way for a source to have its pretreatment standard 
altered. If the discharger discharges a toxic pollutant which is wholly or partially removed by 
the POTW, without affecting the POTW's sludge use or disposal, so that the amount of toxic 
discharge from the pOTW would not violate the toxic effluent limitation applicable to the 
discharger, had it discharged into waters of the United States, then the pretreatment stan-
dards applicable to that discharger may be revised to reflect the P<>TVv,'s removal of toxic 
effluents. See C.W.A. § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). This "revision" mechanism 
was added by the Conference Committee to the 1977 amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 95-
830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87 (1977). If this revision mechanism is considered a variance, 
it is unclear how this would affect the du Pont analysis. Having specified one possible variance, 
Congress may have intended to exclude others. 
260 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
261 See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 57--58 (1972). 
262 du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
268 C.W.A. § 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) (1982). 
264 Compare § 301(b)(2)(A) ("shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if 
... such elimination is technologically and economically achievable .... ") with § 306(a)(1) 
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For both BAT and BCT, it is unlawful for "any person" to discharge 
"any pollutant" in violation of the effluent limitations. 265 For BCT 
and for BAT, with respect to toxic pollutants, there is no statutory 
variance provision. Moreover, both BAT and BCT are supposed to 
be nationally uniform standards within each class or category. Thus, 
whatever the difference between the statutory provisions for BAT 
and BCT, and new source standards, they pale beside the similari-
ties. 
The decisions in Crushed Stone and Chemical Manufacturers 
seem to depart from the clear teaching of du Pont. In both cases, 
but particularly Chemical Manufacturers, the Court explains that 
the purpose of the FDF variance "is to remedy categories which 
were not accurately drawn because information was either not avail-
able to or not considered by the Administrator in setting the original 
categories and limitations."266 The variance is "an acknowledgment 
that not all relevant factors were taken sufficiently into account" in 
framing the effluent limitation. 267 The effect of this failure may re-
dound to the detriment of a particular plant. As a lower court stated 
after Crushed Stone, "[t]he purpose of the variance is to allow an 
individual determination ... where it is clear that the factors con-
sidered by EPA in setting the generic ... limitations are so different 
for a particUlar point source as to make the generic . . . limitation 
unfair. "268 
These statements suggest that the purpose of the variance,' and 
hence the need to which it responds, attaches to the nature of 
rulemaking itself - or at least rulemaking that is supposed to dis-
tinguish between categories and classes of polluters on the basis of 
specified factors. That is, if, in the course of a generic rulemaking, 
certain particular circumstances are overlooked, which were sup-
posed to be considered, the resulting generic rule may be inaccurate. 
A variance procedure provides a means to correct the error as to an 
aggrieved party whose particular circumstances were overlooked. 269 
("including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants"). 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1982). 
265 See C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). 
266 Chemical M.frs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110. See also Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 78. 
267 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110. 
268 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 809 (4th Cir. 1982). 
269 It might be suggested that the appropriate solution is to invalidate the generic rule itself, 
for failure to consider "relevant factors." See Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971). Indeed, those subjected to effluent limitations have pursued that route. See, 
e.g., Assocation of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980). However, courts have 
been reluctant to overturn generic effluent limitations merely because EPA failed to consider 
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In Crushed Stone, such an analysis might be harmonized with du 
Pont's analysis of new source standards. In Crushed Stone, the only 
rules at issue were those involving the section 301 BPT limitations, 
which, unlike the case for new sources, the statute did not require 
to be categorical regulations. In Chemical Manufacturers, however, 
even this distinction disappears. In Chemical Manufacturers, the 
regulations at issue were pretreatment standards promulgated un-
der section 307(b), and this section manifests the same characteris-
tics of a clear congressional intent against a variance that the Court 
had found in section 306.270 Nevertheless, in addressing whether the 
FDF variances might frustrate the goals and operation of the sta-
tutory scheme, the Court in Chemical Manufacturers expressly 
rejected the claim that FDF variances were inconsistent with uni-
form effluent limitations. The Court found that Congress had only 
intended for "similar point sources with similar characteristics [to] 
meet similar effluent limitations. "271 More broadly, the Court in 
Chemical Manufacturers suggests that FDF variances are appro-
priate, if not required, whenever EPA must set effluent limitations 
by categories or classes. 272 
a particular plant's circumstances, especially given the ambitious statutory deadlines for EPA 
action. See id. at 810-11; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1049 (3d Cir. 
1975). Often the information was simply unavailable to EPA at the time of the rulemaking. 
Moreover, courts have used the existence of a variance procedure as a justification for not 
invalidating regulations - the only aggrieved party can obtain relief without upsetting the 
entire regulatory regime. Association of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 816 ("it seems to us that 
the variance procedures and periodic statutory review mechanisms are adequate vehicles to 
correct whatever errors the Agency made in its initial, admittedly not completely thorough, 
effort to formulate effluent guidelines"). 
270 See supra note 118. Pursuant to the consent decree, EPA promulgated two standard 
levels: one at BPT and the other at BAT. That one of the standards is substantively based on 
a BPT level of technology does not suggest any similarity to du Pont. As the dissent in 
Chemical Mfrs. suggests, the apparent distinguishing feature of the BPT limitations in du 
Pont was not the level of technology required, but the methodology by which it was to be 
applied to the industry. See Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1120 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
With respect to the pretreatment standards involved in Chemical Mfrs., however, there is 
no question - whatever the level of control required - that the method of application is by 
generic regulation pursuant to section 307(b). After all, dischargers subject to the pretreat-
ment standards do not even require an NPDES permit. 
271 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
126 (1972)). In du Pont, the Court concluded that "a variance provision would be inappropriate 
in a standard that was intended to insure national uniformity .... " du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138. 
Indeed, the court of appeals in du Pont explained its reason for requiring variances for both 
new sources and for existing sources: "[t]he balance of general rule and narrow exceptions 
assures all possible uniformity without sacrifice of the flexibility needed to adjust for disparate 
plants in dissimilar circumstances." du Pont, 541 F.2d at 1028. 
272 In its discussion of FDF variances, the court noted that 
[u]nderstandably, EPA may not be apprised of and will fail to consider unique factors 
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What then is left of the holding in du Pont with respect to new 
source standards? Did the Court in Chemical Manufacturers decide 
that FDF variances are authorized for pretreatment standards, and 
by implication for BAT and BCT limitations, notwithstanding the 
Court's express denial that it was addressing this issue?273 It is 
difficult to reconcile the Court's explanation for its conclusion re-
garding new source variances in du Pont with its explanation and 
conclusion in Chemical Manufacturers. However, despite Chemical 
Manufacturers, there remain at least three possible justifications 
for the Court's actual conclusion in du Pont. First, the issue in du 
Pont with respect to new source standards was whether variances 
were required, as the court below had concluded. The Court's hold-
ing, that they were not, is not necessarily at odds with an expansive 
view of an agency's permissive authority to provide a variance pro-
cedure. While the language of du Pont suggests that variances from 
the new source standards are prohibited, and the language in C hem-
ical Manufacturers suggests variances in similar situations are ad-
visable, neither characterization is necessary for the decisions in 
these cases. Second, as suggested earlier,274 the opinions in du Pont 
and Chemical Manufacturers do not attach importance to the dis-
tinction between standards to govern already existing plants and 
standards to govern plants not yet under construction. Nevertheless, 
since new plants can be built in light of a standard, it is certainly a 
grounds for distinction.275 In fact, in du Pont the EPA relied on this 
distinction to argue against the court of appeals' requirement for a 
new source variance. 276 Third, the nature of the variance was not 
273Id. at 1107 n.13. 
274 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
275 EPA clearly makes this distinction. Thus, its FDF variance is available with respect to 
all limitations placed on classes or categories of existing dischargers, including dischargers 
into POTW's. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(b) (1984). On the other hand, no FDF variance is available 
to any new discharger, including a new discharger into a POTW. The different treatment of 
new and existing dischargers into POTW's is decisive, because the statute makes no substan-
tive distinction between them. Compare C.W.A. § 307(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(b), (1982). ("Pre-
treatment standards. . . shall be established to prevent the discharge of any pollutant through 
[a POTW), which pollutant interferes with, passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with 
such works.") with C.W.A. § 307(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c) (1982) ("[P)retreatment standards 
shall prevent the discharge of any pollutant into [a POTW), which pollutant may interfere 
with, pass through, or otherwise be incompatible with such works. "). 
276 See Brief of Administrator, EPA, supra note 60, at 8, 13-14. 
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before the Court in du Pont. Thus, it is possible that the seeming 
rejection of a variance from the new source standards is a rejection 
of the "exception" variance, rather than a "correcting" variance. 277 
While there is nothing in the du Pont decision to suggest such a 
distinction,278 support for such a distinction might be found in Chem-
ical Manufacturers, where the Court goes to great lengths to dis-
tinguish the FDF variance from an "exception."279 
Thus, despite the statement in Chemical Manufacturers that the 
Court need not and would not address the authority of EPA to grant 
FDF variances from BAT limitations or pretreatment standards , 280 
the Court seems to have provided the answer for every relevant 
question, except the way to distinguish du Pont. Moreover, the 
Court has seemingly authorized FDF variances whenever the reg-
ulatory scheme specifies that limitations shall be set for classes and 
categories of existing sources. Consequently, although unmentioned 
by the Court, the analysis clearly supports FDF variances for BCT 
limitations. 
The Court left unanswered, as well as unaddressed, the status of 
variances from other of the effluent limitations,281 such as secondary 
treatment for POTW,282 limitations based on water quality stan-
dards,283 and health-based toxic effluent standards.284 EPA has not 
provided a variance procedure for them, just as it has never provided 
a variance from standards applicable to new sources. Has the Court 
in Chemical Manufacturers extended to EPA an invitation to pro-
vide even greater regulatory flexibility? It appears unlikely. Of these 
additional effluent limitations, only the health-based standards for 
toxic pollutants, which can be set under section 307(a)(2) as a stricter 
alternative to BAT, are to be set for a "category or categories" of 
dischargers. 285 Thus, an FDF variance would seem inept for the 
other limitations since miscategorization due to fundamentally dif-
~7 In Chemical Mfrs., the Court took pains to characterize the FDF variance as the setting 
of particularized standards, rather than as an exemption from the standards. See Chemical 
Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1110-11. 
~8 Indeed, the thrust of the decision of the court below was in terms of a procedure that 
would enable particularized standards where "disparate plants in dissimilar circumstances" 
were inappropriately subsumed under the categorical regulation. See du Pont, 541 F.2d at 
1028. Moreover, the variance EPA provided for BPT was the FDF variance. 
279 Chemical Mfrs., 105 S. Ct. at 1107 n.13. 
280 [d. 
281 Currently, EPA has not provided for any variances from them. 
282 See C.W.A. § 301(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1982). 
283 See C.W.A. §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 302, 303(d), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312, 1313(d) (1982). 
284 See C.W.A. § 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982). 
285 C.W.A. § 307(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(5) (1982). 
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ferent factors simply would not be possible. Even if EPA failed to 
consider some fundamental factor that was different for one plant, 
since the limitations are not set by classes or categories of dischar-
gers, the plant would not have been placed in the wrong category. 
The correction, if one were to be made, would have to be to the 
underlying regulation. Otherwise, only a hardship exception would 
be possible. However, the Court in Chemical Manufacturers gave 
no indication that hardship exceptions would be treated the same as 
FDF variances. Indeed, the Court's effort to distinguish FDF var-
iances from hardship exceptions suggests the contrary. Even with 
respect to the health-based toxic effluent limitations, it is difficult 
for an FDF variance ever to apply, because none of the listed factors 
to be taken into account in setting the health-based limitations relate 
to the plant or plants involved.286 Thus, the question is whether 
fundamentally different factors could ever be involved.287 Conse-
quently, it is not probable that the EPA's expansive authority to 
adopt FDF variance procedures, which was supported by the Court 
in Chemical Manufacturers, will have repercussions beyond the 
variance procedures EPA has already adopted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In du Pont, the Court without explanation required a variance 
procedure for section 301(a) BPT effluent limitations. The Court 
proceeded, with an intrinsically weak analysis, to prohibit variances 
for new source standards. Neither the requirement nor the prohib-
ition were necessary for decision of the case. In fact, both were mere 
inventions of the Court. As a result, however, these almost gratui-
tous declarations forced the Court to address the necessary scope of 
286 Arguably, two matters might be more or less site specific: one relates to the "usual" 
presence of an affected organism; the other relates to the extent effective control may be 
achieved under other regulatory authority. As to the first, the provision states that EPA is 
to consider the "usual" presence of the organism in "any waters." This suggests that this 
consideration need not be site specific. The second matter is less clear, especially if "other 
regulatory authority" refers to a governmental jurisdiction as opposed to other generally 
applicable laws or regulations. 
287 There is a possibility in section 307(a)(6). This subsection requires that any health-based 
limitation under this section take effect within one year of its promulgation, unless such a 
date is "technologically infeasible for a category of sources," in which case the limitation is to 
be effective as soon as feasible after one year, but no later than after three years. Thus, it is 
possible that a plant in a category required to be in compliance within one year might assert 
that fundamentally different factors applicable to it indicate it should be considered in a 
category that has up to three years to comply. C.W.A. § 307(a)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(6) 
(1982). 
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the "required" variance. Moreover, in Chemical Manufacturers, the 
Court virtually stood the Clean Water Act on its head to find that a 
statutory prohibition against any modifications was only a prohibition 
against two specific modifications. This is a twisted result that the 
Court could justify only by reaffirming the necessity of an FDF 
variance procedure as "recognized" in du Pont. It is even possible 
that the·Court will be forced to address the FDF variance a fourth 
time, if a party raises the unanswered question of the general per-
missibility of FDF variances for pretreatment standards. 288 
Why have litigants and the Court made such a fuss over a variance 
that EPA has granted only twice since the procedure was created? 
Before the Court's decision in Crushed Stone, industry had hopes 
that the variance would be available in more circumstances than only 
when fundamentally different factors were present. If it had been, 
then industry's goal of individualized effluent limitations might have 
been realized. Even with a standard conditioned on the presence of 
fundamentally different factors, industry could hope that EPA would 
apply those terms in a liberal manner. This, however, has not been 
EPA's approach. Rather, as one court described the FDF variance, 
EPA has treated the FDF variance as a "pin-hole safety valve."289 
Changes in administrations did not affect EPA's niggardly approach. 
A 1982 internal EPA memorandum recommending the denial of 
FDF variances to two Alaskan paper mills provides a rare glimpse 
into the bureaucratic realities that underlie EPA's reluctance to 
grant FDF variances. 29o The two paper mills applied for NPDES 
permits that would grant FDF variances to their BOD and TSS 
discharges.291 The EPA regional administrator issued a tentative 
decision to grant the variance because the land availability, energy 
constraints, and costs were fundamentally different for these two 
plants than for the other plants in the dissolving sUlphite subcategory 
288 On remand, the Third Circuit did not address the question of the general permissibility 
of FDF variances from pretreatment standards, and NRDC did not raise the issue. Telephone 
discussion with attorney in Lands and Natural Resources Division of the United States 
Department of Justice. 
289 Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1040. 
290 Memorandum to Bruce Barrett, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water, from Martha 
Prothro, Acting Director of the Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, Steven Schatzow, 
Director of the Office of Water Regulations and Standards, and Bruce Diamond, Acting 
Director of the Water and Solid Waste Division of the Office of General Counsel (February 3, 
1982) (on file with author) [hereinafter referred to as Memorandum to Bruce Barrett]. 
291 BOD refers to units of biochemical oxygen demand. It is a measure of the amount of 
oxygen in water needed to decompose organic wastes in the water. Because oxygen is nec-
essary for aquatic life, organic wastes discharged into water can use that oxygen up, killing 
fish and plants. TSS refers to total suspended solids. 
1985] FDF VARIANCES 59 
of kraft paper manufacturers. In Washington, D.C., however, mid-
level staff from the Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, the 
Office of Water Regulations and Standards, and the Office of General 
Counsel opposed the granting of the variance. Despite the fact that 
the costs were conceded to be 1.4 to 2.0 times greater than the plant 
upon which the BPT effluent limitation had been based, and the 
energy and land considerations had not been "clearly considered, "292 
the staff warned that "a large number of dischargers possibly could 
qualify for relief," and "the number of variance requests would in-
crease significantly" if these requests were granted. 293 They further 
warned that variance requests are "highly resource intensive, and a 
significant increase in the number of variances would serve to upset 
permitting priorities and ability to reduce the backlog of expired 
industrial permits. "294 Moreover, the staff suggested that if the var-
iance was granted the NRDC might challenge it, because NRDC 
had been following one of the permits closely. Such a challenge, the 
staff counselled, would render the EPA "legally vulnerable" because 
"the courts will tend to require that variances be granted only in 
compelling circumstances."295 The staff, however, recommended giv-
ing the Alaskan plants relief through another mechanism, which, in 
the staff's eyes, was both less resource intensive and less vulnerable 
to legal challenge.296 The staff's analysis reflects the institutional 
reasons why even arguably meritorious FDF variance requests are 
unlikely to be granted. When there is any doubt, deny. 
If this analysis of EPA's institutional behavior is accurate, Chem-
ical Manufacturers is not likely to have important environmental 
consequences, notwithstanding the fact that the Court broadened 
the range of effluent limitations and standards for which an FDF 
292 Memorandum to Bruce Barrett, supra note 289, at 8. 
293 [d. at 1. 
294 [d. at 1-2. 
295 [d. at 8. This prognostication is somewhat speculative. Prior to Crushed Stone, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the FDF variance procedure in a challenge to the pulp and paper mill effluent 
limitations. There dischargers alleged that du Pont required an allowance for special circum-
stances that was broader than what EPA had provided in its FDF variance provision. The 
court held that the FDF variance fulfilled the du Pont requirement while assuring "that the 
pinhole safety valve ... does not become a yawning loophole." Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 
1040. In context, this statement contrasts the FDF variance from the broader variance 
provision industry sought; it did not suggest that a variance request meeting the FDF 
requirements could only be granted in compelling circumstances. The staff memorandum, of 
course, was written well after Crushed Stone, which upheld the particulars of the FDF 
variance procedure without any suggestion that it could only be utilized in compelling circum-
stances. 
296 In fact, this relief was not granted either. 
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variance could be granted. The Court's application of the Chevron 
doctrine in Chemical Manufacturers is potentially significant. The 
Chevron doctrine requires that, in the absence of a specific congres-
sional intent on the precise issue, courts must uphold an agency's 
reasonable construction of this statute. Here, though, the 5-4 split 
with Justice Stevens, Chevron's author in the minority, suggests 
that Chemical Manufacturers' strict application of that doctrine is 
less than fully secure. Finally, Chemical Manufacturers is like a 
chapter in a legal morality play, showing how the Court, once it 
departed from the law and began to construct new creations, ever 
had to keep patching that creation, reconstructing the law. 
